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I. Introduction
Human participants' need for protection in research received substantial
attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s because of public disclosure of
abuses in research.' After substantial study, the National Commission for
Protection in Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(NCPHS) made numerous substantive and procedural recommendations for a
process that would help ensure that research projects involving human partici-
pants were appropriately designed and carried out.2 In response, the federal
government enacted regulations that require institutions to assure federal
agencies that their researchers will obtain both approval of research procedures
by an institutional review board (IRB) before commencing the research project
and written informed consent from research participants throughout the
project.3 Those regulations were well received, and, as one commentator has
noted, "everything seemed settled" by the 1980s."
However, the environment for biomedical/biotechnology research involv-
ing human participants has changed in the last two decades and the discussion
of how to improve the process of protecting human research participants has
again moved to the forefront of the debate.5 Indeed, a flurry of activity by
1. A well-known example is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. See Kathryn A. Tuthill,
Human Experimentation: Protecting Patient Autonomy Through Informed Consent, 18 J.
LEGAL MED. 221, 231 n.71 (1997) (explaining that the United States Public Health Service
studied hundreds of poor African American men in order to develop and understand the natural
history of syphilis).
Concerns also grew out of stories of abuse revealed during the Nuremberg trails, the
promotional distribution of thalidomide resulting in numerous children born with birth defects,
the administration of cancer cells to chronically ill and senile patients at a hospital in New York,
and others. See Dep't of HHS, Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards: Their
Role in ReviewingApproved Research, Doc. No. OEI-01-97-00190, at 3 (June 1998) [hereinaf-
ter IRB's Role] (describing roots of concern about the treatment of human subjects).
2. The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelinesfor the Protection of Human
Participants of Research (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
23192 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter Belmont Report].
3. Regulations for Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1996).
4. See James F. Childress, The National Bioethics Advisory Commission: Bridging the
Gaps in Human Research Protection, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & PoL'Y 105, 106 (1998) (noting
that by the 1980s, the main focus of debate had switched to research on animals).
5. Additionally, numerous abuses to research subjects came to light in a recent examina-
tion of the records of several thousand experiments funded and conducted, mostly in secret, by
different branches of the federal government. See Childress, supra note 4, at 106 (describing
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federal regulators, the research community and scholars has recently taken
place as concerns stemming from the changing research environment have
come to light.6 The changes in the research environment include more compe-
tition for research money and an increased commercialization of research.
Together, the changes have resulted in a more entrepreneurial approach to
research and development of innovative medical treatments, techniques, drugs,
and devices such as surgical or diagnostic instruments.
An entrepreneurial approach to research means that scientists conduct
research with an emphasis on commercial applications and generating revenue
for the institution as well as for individual researchers.7 Through cooperative
arrangements with for-profit businesses and industries, university research is
more quickly transferred into the private market, and institutions and research-
ers share in the profits. The approach leads to an environment that is competi-
tive, fast-paced, and laced with more tangible financial conflicts of interest
arising at multiple points throughout the research process. The existence of
financial conflicts of interest is not unique to the biomedical/biotechnology
research arenas. But, because biomedical/biotechnology research more often
involves human participants, financial conflicts of interest in this arena and the
incentives they create must meet a higher level of scrutiny.8
Importantly, the entrepreneurial factor is present within the community
of academic medical centers, where the majority of biomedical/biotechnology
research has traditionally occurred, as well as in the growing for-profit experi-
mentation industry. The for-profit experimentation industry, involving "human
experimentation corporations" that aggressively recruit research participants
and use independent for-profit IRBs, presents unique and pressing regulatory
problems.9 However, this Article addresses the entrepreneurial factor within
the work of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments from 1994-95).
6. See, e.g., Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Legal and Ethical Issues, 8
WIDENER L. SYhP. J. 1, 1-162 (2001) (devoting an entire issue to problems regarding research
environment).
7. Infra notes 10-31 and accompanying text.
8. The term "biomedical research" broadly encompasses research involving biological,
medical and physical science. "Biotechnology" is but a subset of biomedical research and has
been described as involving the application of engineering and technological principles to living
organisms or their components to produce new inventions or processes. One distinction is that
biotechnology research and biotechnology firms are geared toward discovering breakthroughs.
Gina A. Kuhlman, A lliances for the Future: Cultivating a Cooperative Environmentfor Biotech
Success, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311,314 (1996).
9. See generally Dep't ofHHS, Office of Inspector General, Recruiting Human Subjects:
Pressures in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, Doc. No. OEI-01-97-00195 (June 2000).
The Office of Inspector General noted that industry-sponsored trials are shifting from academic
medical centers to private practice settings and that the number of private practice-based
investigators grew from 3,513 in 1990 to 11,588 in 1995. Id. at 12. See also Dep't of HHS,
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academic medical centers. In particular, this Article focuses on the increasing
concern about conflicts of interest arising from financial arrangements between
commercial entities and university-based research centers and their research-
ers.
Financial conflicts of interest within the academic research environment
present a more difficult regulatory dilemma because of the general integrity of
the academic community. Regulatory agencies historically have trusted the
academic research community to oversee the research process and to ensure
protection for human research participants. The increasing use of the research
process to generate profits for universities and their researchers does not mean
that the academic community can no longer be trusted. However, it does mean
that universities and their researchers are operating under significant conflicts
of interest more frequently than they previously had. Accordingly, the key
federal agencies overseeing research involving human participants-the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration-have an obligation to the public to preserve complete integrity and
objectivity in research involving human participants, as well as the perception
of complete integrity and objectivity.
The federal agencies have recognized this need and initiated discussions
with the academic research community. A consensus exists among agencies
and universities that something should be done to temper any potential nega-
tive consequences flowing from the rampant financial conflicts of interest
facing researchers and institutions. However, little consensus has emerged as
to the proper way to address the problem. This Article hopes to advance the
discussion. The Article first reviews the problem of financial conflicts of
interest and the inadequacies of the current regulatory regime in relation to that
problem. The Article then outlines some of the emerging initiatives at the
federal and institutional levels. Finally, the Article identifies deficiencies in
those initiatives and offers suggestions for more comprehensive and effective
regulatory intervention.
More specifically, the Article advocates a stronger federal role in all
aspects of the regulatory process, from standard setting to enforcement. The
Article fleshes out standards that should be used and analyzes the appropriate-
ness of proposed regulatory responses. Additionally, the Article provides a
rough outline of a more streamlined system that rejects the idea of the overlap-
ping "designated institutional official" and a "conflicts of interest committee,"
which virtually all proposals to date have included. The Article suggests
instead an office akin to an Office of Financial Conflicts Management and an
Office or Committee for Patient and Research Protection, the former with
Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards: The Emergence of Independent
Boards, Doe. No. OEI-01-97-00192, at 5-7 (June 1998) [hereinafter The Emergence of
Independent Boards] (describing concerns regarding for-profit IRBs).
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expertise related to financial matters and the latter with expertise related to the
scientific aspects of the research process. Importantly, the proposed system
would eliminate the need to further burden IRBs, which most proposals to date
inappropriately would do. This Article does not discuss the position that all
research involving human participants-and not just studies subject to current
federal regulation-should come within the scope of any new regulatory
scheme. Rather, the focus of this Article is on standards, regulatory responses,
and enforcement procedures.
I The Shift to a More "Entrepreneurial" Research Environment
The environment for research involving human participants in the last two
decades has undergone significant changes that have diminished the
protections put in place in the 1970s. During the 1970s and the early 1980s,
most research involving human participants took place under government
funding in a university teaching hospital with established research-related
controls. Clinical trials typically involved a small cohort of participants, and
a single investigator at a single institution generally conducted them.'" IRB
workloads were limited and allowed sufficient opportunities to deliberate
research proposals." The environment is much different today because of
more competition for research dollars and the increasing commercialization of
research.'2
A. Reasons Underlying the Changing Focus ofAcademic Research
At the most basic level, the reason for the increased competition for
research dollars and the commercialization of biomedical/biotechnology
research is the need for funds to support a university's research mission and
status." In part, this can be tied to the shift to managed care. Managed care,
with its emphasis on cost control and efficiency-based reimbursement method-
ologies, has eliminated the subsidy for research inherent in the fee-for-service,
reasonable cost reimbursement environment. In response, institutions have
pressured their physicians and researchers to find outside funding. As physi-
10. Dep't of HHS, Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards: A Time for
Reform, Doe. No. OEI-01-97-00193 (June 1998) [hereinafterA Timefor Reform] (citing Harold
Edgar & David J. Rothman, The IRB and Beyond: Future Challenges to the Ethics of Human
Experimentation, 73 MILBANK Q. 489,489-506 (1995)).
11. Id.
12. See A Time for Reform, supra note 10, at 4-9 (describing criticism leveled against
IRBs for their failure to protect human participants).
13. Until last year, ranking of universities (e.g., the highest level was a Research I
university) was based on federal funding of research. Currently, ranking is based on a number
of factors.
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cians at university teaching hospitals have been pressured to generate income,
especially research-related funding, the number of grant applications received
by the National Institutes of Health has increased dramatically.14 At the same
time, there has been a decrease in the rate of growth of federal research fund-
ing." The result has been an increasingly competitive environment for finite
federal research funds.
Universities therefore have been motivated to find alternative financing
methods to support research activities. Two primary sources have surfaced.
First, private industry, in particular biomedical/biotechnology firms, has
increasingly offered to sponsor university-conducted research to allow for
expedited product development and marketing. 6 Second, an additional source
of revenue has arisen from the commercialization of intellectual property
through university technology transfer offices (TTOs). Through technology
transfer, a university makes an invention or discovery available to the for-profit
sector for commercial development. 7
Both of these developments are in part a consequence of the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980.18 Before the passage of the Act, title to all discoveries or inven-
14. See Kenneth Sutherlin Ducker, BioBusiness on Campus: Commercialization of
University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 457-58 (1997)
(noting that the number of National Institutes of Health (NIH) grant applications increased over
10% in 1993 alone); see also Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent
Policy: The University Contribution, 82 VA. L. REv. 1729, 1733 (1996) (noting that NIH and
National Science Foundation fund only about 10% of the applications they receive).
15. See James S. Fairweather, Academic Research and Instruction: The Industrial
Connection, 60 J. HIGHER EDUC. 388,393 (1989) (documenting the reduction in funding and
the effect on academic facilities and laboratory equipment).
16. In the mid 1990s, industry provided approximately 7% of national university research
funds in the form of sponsored research agreements. Steve L. Bertha, Intellectual Property
Activities in U.S. Research Universities, 36 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 513, 520 (1996). Universities
rely on corporate sponsors for support of biotechnology research because they need funding
sources, and biotechnology firms rely on university research because of the expertise and
sophisticated lab equipment required to conduct biotechnology research, both of which are
available at university research centers. See generally Kuhlman, supra note 8.
Additionally, it has been noted that commercial entities are increasingly looking to
universities for new developments because of the realization that "technology is moving too fast
for any one company to keep ahead on its own. For the biotechnology industry, and particularly
for that segment concerned with therapeutics, the university is the primary source of new
product ideas." Ducker, supra note 14, at 469.
17. The Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) defines "technology
licensing" as including "activities associated with the evaluation and marketing of technology
(including trademarks but not the university's insignia) and intellectual property management,
and those of license administration." The definition does not include activities associated with
industry research agreements. ASS'NoFUNrv. TECH. MANAGERs,LICENSING SURVEY: FY 1994
SURVEY SUMMARY AND SELECTED DATA FY 199 1-FY 1994, at 13 (1995).
18. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at
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tions developed with federal funding in whole or in part reverted to the federal
government. "9 Prior to 1980, the federal government funded more than two-
thirds of academic research, and the majority of university-developed technolo-
gies became subject to government-held patents. The federal government had
hoped that retaining title would spur innovation and development." However,
few companies were willing to take licenses on government-held patents,
especially small businesses, which lacked the resources and time to deal with
the required bureaucratic red tape.21 The result of these federal policies was
that valuable tax dollars were used to develop ideas that were inaccessible to
those businesses that could put them to viable use.22
Recognizing the problem, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
and fundamentally altered the treatment of the university research product.
Under the language of the Act, small businesses and nonprofit organizations
may elect to take title to inventions conceived or first reduced to practice in the
performance of work under federal funding agreements by filing for patents
and complying with certain reporting and other requirements.23 The Act
defines the term "inventions" as "any invention or discovery which is or may
be patentable."24 Patenable discoveries include surgical and diagnostic instru-
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000)).
19. The rationale underlying the prior practice was simple: if tax dollars paid for the
research behind an invention, the government should own it. Government ownership was seen
as a good thing because it would keep inventions in the public domain. See Dueker, supra note
14, at 459-60 (explaining that certain government policies contain a presumption of title resting
in the federal government).
20. The goal was to support basic research in academia (as well as in national laborato-
ries) with the expectation that researchers would publish their results in scientific journals. The
resulting "free information" would then be used by industry to develop new products and
processes that would benefit society. Bertha, supra note 16, at 514.
21. See Ducker, supra note 14, at 460 (stating that bureaucratic process discouraged many
companies from working with the government).
22. In 1978, the year the Bayh-Dole Act was introduced, the federal government spent
over $30 billion to develop 28,000 patents, but licensed only 5% of them. Id. at 461.
23. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 201-02 (2000) (describing requirements for taking title). A
university must elect title by notifying the federal agency within a reasonable time after the
initial disclosure. Id. § 202(c). Should the university not elect to retain title, the funding agency
may grant title to the inventor (i.e., the university employee). 37 C.F.R. § 401.9 (1999); 35
U.S.C. § 202(d) (2000). The Act defines a "subject invention" as "an invention of the contractor
conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding
agreement." 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2000). It defines "funding agreement" as "any contract, grant,
or cooperative agreement entered into between any Federal Agency ... and any contractor for
the performance of experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whole or in part
by the Federal Government." Id. § 20 1(b).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2000).
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ments, drugs, and devices, as well as medical procedures and techniques.2"
Thus, biomedical/biotechnology research often leads to products or discoveries
that are patentable.
The primary purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act were to ensure that the patent
system promoted the use of inventions arising from university-supported
research and development, to encourage maximum participation of small
business firms in federally supported research and development efforts, and to
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organiza-
tions, including universities.26 These purposes have no doubt been served. The
likelihood that a scientific finding will quickly produce a useful and marketable
product has greatly increased since the Bayh-Dole Act has provided incentives
to those best able to develop biomedical advances.27
At the same time, the ability to "take title" affords universities the oppor-
tunity to license patented or patentable technologies and to negotiate a share
of the receipts generated by the commercial product.2" Universities have
wholeheartedly embraced this opportunity to generate unrestricted funds.
Indeed, a virtual explosion of interest and activity in intellectual property and
technology transfer on university campuses has occurred. That explosion has
been especially pronounced in the biotechnology/biomedical arena. The right
to share in revenues conferred by the Bayh-Dole Act, when coupled with a
university's need for funding sources, has created an incentive for universities
to try to negotiate license terms that will maximize the share of the profits they
receive."9 Indeed, the money-making aspect of today's biomedical research
25. See American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical
Issues in the Patenting ofMedical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341,341 (1998) (explain-
ing that patents taken out on medical procedures and techniques arc referred to as "medical
process patents"). See generally Joseph A. Reisman, Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors:
Reconciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 355 (1995)
(detailing the history of the question whether medical and surgical procedures are patentable).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). It was claimed that preferential treatment should be accorded
to small businesses and universities because they had stronger incentives than large businesses
to promote widespread commercialization of inventions, but needed exclusive rights in a
discovery to motivate commercial development. Further, small businesses and universities
typically would not have sufficient market power for the acquisition of title to raise antitrust
concerns. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. RE''. 1663, 1695-99 (1996).
27. Transcript, Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial Conflicts of
Interest (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter August 15 Conference Transcript] (statement of Dr. Ruth
Kirschstein, Acting Director of NIH), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/coi/8-15.htm.
28. Universities can generate substantial revenue streams through both nonexclusive and
exclusive licensing arrangements. See Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 1710-12 (noting that the
revenue motives of universities inevitably operate at cross-purposes with the larger patent policy
goal of promoting product development by enhancing its profitability to businesses).
29. Eisenberg notes:
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 15 (2003)
environment has led to the comment that the Bayh-Dole Act "is often used [by
universities] as an excuse for making as much money as possible in as many
possible ways.."
30
Still, for many universities, the aggressive pursuit of technology transfer
is not solely for the purpose of bringing unrestricted revenue into the univer-
sity's coffers. Rather, the pursuit is also attributable to the demands from state
and local governments and industry that universities become engines responsi-
ble for regional economic development. 31 Because many universities depend
on appropriations from state and local governments, these demands cannot be
ignored. Regardless of the impetus, however, the result has been a more
entrepreneurial approach to the university's research mission involving, to a
much greater extent, financial relationships between commercial research
sponsors, biomedical researchers, and the university. Those financial arrange-
ments create very real conflicts of interest.
B. The Resulting Financial Conflicts of Interest
What does it mean to say that today's biomedical research environment
has become more entrepreneurial in nature? Basically, it means that universi-
ties and researchers have supplemented their traditional focus on basic research
geared towards increasing scientific knowledge of fundamental systems or
mechanisms with a focus directed increasingly towards commercial applica-
tions of scientific advances that can earn money. 2 It means that researchers
and their affiliated institutions desire to create a market for new treatments,
procedures, devices, or drugs, and they hope to become the recognized expert
in those markets or to generate revenue for the university through the transfer
of technology and innovation to the market.
Importantly, it also means that, as a result of the university-corporate
interaction spawned by the Bayh-Dole Act, innovative approaches to financing
Nothing other than forbearance on the part of universities, and resistance on the
part of potential licensees, prevents universities from striking deals that would
extract the full amount of rents from development of a patented product to the
universities themselves, which would leave the innovating firms in exactly the same
position they would be in if the discovery had been placed in the public domain.
Id. at 1711.
30. Transcript, Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial Conflicts of
Interest (Aug. 16, 2000) [hereinafter August 16 Conference Transcript] (statement of Marcia
Angell), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/Coi/8-16.htm.
31. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27 (statement of David Korn).
32. See generally David Blumenthal et al., Relationship Between Academic Institutions
and Industry in the Life Sciences-An Industry Survey, 334 New ENG. J MED. 368 (1996);
David Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology:
Implications for the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361 (1986); Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of
Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15 (1999).
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and corporate partnering have emerged. As part and parcel of the emerging
financial arrangements, academic researchers may receive cash, consulting
fees or honoraria, stocks or other ownership interests, or intellectual property
rights.3 Thus, individual researchers can benefit not only from the enhanced
reputation and academic standing that may accompany a scientific break-
through, but also from resulting financial incentives. Although these financial
incentives have always existed to some extent, they are intensified in today's
entrepreneurial environment in which researchers may assume the role not only
of clinical investigators, but also of sponsors of investigations, inventors
named on patents, and product manufacturers.34
Perhaps more importantly, to satisfy the intensified institutional need for
research monies-monies needed to help fund the university's research mis-
sion and to help elevate the university's standing among institu-
tions-universities themselves are increasingly entering into arrangements
with for-profit entities. These commercial entities either directly fund research
projects or indirectly do so by channeling monies back to the university after
university research has been transferred into a usable product. Although
comprising only a small percentage of the revenue stream for most universities,
those revenue streams are growing.35 Further, monies from technology trans-
fers are cherished because the monies are unrestricted funds that a university
can use in a discretionary manner.36 For example, the following diagram
illustrates the types of arrangements increasingly entered into by universities
and commercial entities.
33. Generally, the individual researcher/inventor receives a portion of the technology-
transfer revenue. The Bayh-Dole Act mandates that the researcher receive some share, albeit
an indeterminate one, of the royalties under agreements to which the Act applies. 35 U.S.C.
§ 202(c)(7)(B) (2000). See generally Lynne J. Bowers & Vickie Leon, Patent Policies of 65
Education Institutions: A Comparison, Soc. RES. ADMIN. J., Spring 1994, at 5.
34. See generally Kuhlman, supra note 8, at 345; see also Diagram of Common Financial
Arrangements, infra p. 26 [hereinafter Diagram A] (illustrating typical financial arrangements).
35. In 1991 and 1992, university revenue from royalties (e.g., from licenses granted to
industries) was $130 million and $172 million, respectively. See Kuhlman, supra note 8, at
326. In 2000, university revenue from licensed inventions exceeded $1.26 billion. National
Center for Policy Analysis, Bayh-Dole Act: Moving Innovations from the Lab to Patients,
DAILY POL'Y DIGEST, May 13,2002, atwww.ncpa.org/iss/hea/2002/pdO51302c.html. Further,
"while the total number of patents issued each year doubled from 1970 to 1994, the number of
patents issued each year to United States universities increased seven-fold, going from about
250 per year in the early 1970s to 1,761 in 1994 alone." John M. Golden, Biotechnology,
Technology Policy, andPatentability: NaturalProducts and Invention in the American System,
50 EMORY L.J. 101,143 (2001).
36. See Massaro, supra note 14, at 1735 (noting that unrestricted, discretionary funds are
perhaps the most difficult monies to find and yet the most important in allowing a well-prepared
president to shape the future of an institution).
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Diagram A
Schematic Diagram of Typical Process to
Identify and Manage Financial Conflicts of Interest
Faculty Members
- Detailed disclosure of financial/economic
interests held by faculty member related to
via Dan or any research interest
via Dean orDep't Head - Submitted annually to University Official
University icial
- Review for potential conflicts
(assesses extent and nature)
- Detailed disclosure of financial/
economic interests held by
investigator AND the University
related to specific research
project
- Submitted with research protocol
- Questionable conflicts forwarded to
Conflicts Committee
Conflict of Interest Committee
• " -Determines whether a conflict of interest exists
Assesses the nature and extent of the conflict
- Identifies means of managing or eliminating the conflict
Technology Transfer Office
- Communicates with the
Conflicts Committee to







relating to research involving
human subjects
- Ensures that faculty is
informed of the policies and
procedures
- Ensures that IRB members &




- Decides on the appropriate management technique
- Works with the investigator and the University to implement
the management techniques
- Drafts a description of the conflict and the management
techniques
- Drafts recommended disclosure language for informed consent
- Prepares a public disclosure form
- Forwards the protocol, the description of the conflict and
management techniques, the recommended informed consent
language, and the public disclosure form to the IRB
I Monitoring
Institutional Review Board
- Performs traditionally required review of the research protocol
(risks, benefits, research design, etc.)
- Reviews public disclosure form re: the financial interests, the
description of the conflicts and management techniques, and the
recommended disclosure language for informed consent (veto
power)
- Monitors the IRB and conflicts of - Determines the appropriate content form and forum for the
interest processes procedures informed consent
Performs traditional continuing oversight plus additional
oversight if recommended
Forwards the public disclosure form to the appropriate
University office so it is available for public review
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On the whole, such financial arrangements enable the kinds of knowledge
transfer and technology transfer that Congress envisioned. From the perspec-
tive of the stream of products entering the healthcare marketplace, the public
is clearly better off as a result of these new relationships.37 However, the
arrangements create conflicts that may interfere with decisions made in the
process of research involving human participants. Moreover, not only does
there exist a greater potential that a researcher's financial interest may influ-
ence his or her research, but the traditional institutional safeguards are argu-
ably less effective because universities also hold financial interests that could
be affected by research. As explained in Part I, IRB review has traditionally
served as the primary check on the appropriateness of research involving
human participants. But IRBs work for institutions. Because of the height-
ened importance of research funding to institutions, as well as the prestige
associated with involvement in cutting edge research, IRBs want to accommo-
date researchers and the university by approving research proposals. Thus,
university-held financial interests may hamper the protection traditionally
afforded through the IRB review process.
The increasing presence of commercial research sponsors in the academic
setting also has other ramifications bearing on oversight of research projects.
Commercial sponsors want prompt reviews for their protocols and have
adopted increasingly active roles, including negotiating research design, rights
to data, and publication rights.3" Further, oversight is often more difficult
because commercially sponsored research studies are often conducted at
multiple sites; indeed, some research is spread across hundreds of sites. 9
Additionally, the objective of and demand for research studies has
evolved. Researchers of course continue to pursue life-saving medical treat-
ments, which can more readily justify the risks associated with experimental
medical care, and there have been dramatic advances in the effort to find new
therapies for cancer and other diseases.4° But, due to the incentives to inno-
vate and to profit, researchers are increasingly pursuing biomedical inventions
and technologies, as well as innovative treatments and procedures, that are
37. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 11 (statement of Dr. Raub,
principal spokesperson on the Secretary's new initiatives to strengthen human subject protec-
tion).
38. See id. at 12-18 (statement of Thomas Bodenheimer, Clinical Professor of Family and
Community Medicine at the University of California-San Francisco) (citing examples of such
conduct).
39. A Time for Reform, supra note 10, at 5.
40. Press Release, HHS, Secretary Shalala Bolsters Protections for Human Research
Participants (May 23, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release, Shalala Bolsters Protections], available
at http'/www.hhs.gov/newa/press/2000pres/20000523.html.
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more elective in nature." When experimental procedures that are not neces-
sarily life-saving are involved, it becomes more difficult for IRBs to strike the
appropriate balance between risk and benefit.
In short, the biomedical/biotechnology research environment has become
competitive and fast-paced, with less institutional and more commercial
control. IRBs are facing tremendous pressures, are being asked to review
projects presenting increasingly complex issues and, in many cases, are not
receiving sufficient support. As a result, a plethora of ethical and practical
concerns have arisen. A series of reports by the Office of the Inspector
General have highlighted and identified these emerging concerns associated
with the IRB process and made recommendations for improving the process.42
The rampant financial conflicts of interest thus are but one consequence
of the changing research environment. But it is one that the media has high-
lighted, thereby fueling public concerns. For example, the press highlighted
violations that occurred during a clinical trial at the University of Pennsylva-
nia in which Jesse Gelsinger died in September 1999.4 When the media
reported the event, the public was appropriately concerned. However, the
acknowledgment that medical research involves risks, and sometimes serious
risks, tempered that concern. The public concern later intensified when it was
revealed that the Food and Drug Administration investigation found protocol
violations by the clinical investigators, including the failure to file serious
adverse-event reports and to notify the National Institutes of Health; that
concern turned to shock when it was discovered and reported that a financial
conflict of interest existed.44 Observers raised questions concerning the
41. At the same time, today's health care consumers are often demanding to participate
in clinical studies. A Time for Reform, supra note 10, at 5.
42. Id.; The Emergence of Independent Boards, supra note 9; IRB's Role, supra note 1;
Dep't of HHS, Office of Inspector General, Institutional Review Boards: Promising Ap-
proaches, Doe. No. OEI-01-00191 (June 1998).
43. Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Teen Dies Undergoing Experimental Gene Therapy,
WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1999, at Al; Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Penn Researchers Sued in
Gene Therapy Death: Teen's ParentsAlso Name Ethicist as Defendant, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
2000, at A3.
44. See August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 32-33 (statement of Dr. Savio
Woo, Professor of Medicine and Director of the Mount Sinai School of Medicine Institute of
Gene Therapy and Molecular Medicine) (discussing heightened levels of concern as more
information in Gelsinger case emerged). Reporters found that
the University of Pennsylvania receive[d] substantial support from a company
founded by the principal researcher and Institute director, and that the University's
conflict of interest rules were altered to permit his ownership of 30% of the com-
pany's stock [, and that the] University itself opted for 15%. The University also
gave the investigator the exclusive right to license patents derived from his institute
to the company and its corporate sponsors.
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financial interests of the investigators and whether those interests clouded
judgment or influenced research designs.45 The increased potential for con-
flicts of interest that could affect professional judgment is therefore a very
serious consequence of a more entrepreneurial approach to biomedical re-
search. Although not intrinsically unacceptable, a more entrepreneurial
research environment nonetheless raises concerns that the current regulatory
framework may not adequately take into account.46
I1. The Current Federal Regulatory Framework
Currently, federal regulation of research involving human participants
follows a model whereby the federal government provides guidance, but
oversight and enforcement is largely left to research institutions therefore.
Protection for human participants in research falls within the authority of two
agencies: the Department of Health and Human Services (-HS) and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within HHS. HHS oversees
research supported through funding from the National Institutes of Health
(NIH). The FDA, as designee of the Secretary of HHS, has authority pursuant
to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act47 to regulate research conducted on
products subject to FDA approval (namely drugs and devices).4"
As noted, the federal regulatory scheme is grounded in trust. Congress
has directed the Secretary of HHS to require any entity that applies for a grant,
contract, or cooperative agreement for any project or program that involves
human participants to submit to the Secretary an "assurance" that it has
established a board to review and monitor biomedical and behavioral re-
Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 253,
269 (2001).
45. E.g., Mark Barnes & Sara Krauss, In Research, Follow the Money: The Rise of
Private Funding Creates Conflicts That Could Be Deadly, LEGAL TIMEs, June 19,2000, at 33.
46. See NIH Notice No. OD-00-040, Financial Conflicts of Interest and Research
Objectivity: Issues for Investigators and the Institutional Review Boards (June 5, 2000)
(hereinafter Financial Conflicts of Interest] (calling for increased sensitivity to financial
conflicts of interest), available at http://grants.nih.gov/ grants/guide/notcie-files/NOT-OD-00-
040.html.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
48. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) defines "drug" to include "articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body." Id. § 321(g)(1)(c). It
defines "device," in part, as "an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,...
or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is ...
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body." Id. § 321(h). The FDCA also
gives the FDA authority to regulate "combination products," which "constitute a combination
of a drug, device, or biological product." Id. § 353(gXl).
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search-i.e., an IRB.' In furtherance of this directive, the Secretary of HHS
has promulgated regulations setting forth more specifically the criteria govern-
ing IRB activity. 50 Like HHS, the FDA relies on the IRB process for protec-
tion of human participants.51 Additionally, seventeen federal agencies that are
involved in research involving human research participants have agreed upon
a set of governing rules. This set of rules is known as the "common rule."52
The agencies that adhere to the common rule have agreed that they will not
modify their policies absent agreement by the other agencies.53
Each of these regulatory schemes-the HHS scheme, the FDA scheme,
'and the common rule-provides protection to human participants through the
dual requirements of IRB approval and oversight and of informed consent.
These schemes have also addressed to some extent the issue of conflicting
interests. The following sections describe the basic IRB and informed consent
requirements and the rules addressing conflicting interests.
A. The Basic Federal Protections: IRB Review and Informed Consent
Because the basic protections established by the HHS and FDA regula-
tions and the common rule are substantially similar, this discussion will refer
to and cite only the HHS regulations. As noted, the HHS regulatory scheme
provides protection to human participants through the dual requirements of
IRB approval and oversight and informed consent. The HHS regulations direct
that an IRB "shall review and have authority to approve, require modifications
in... , or disapprove all research activities." 4 In order to approve research,
the IRB must determine that the risks to participants are minimized and that the
procedures being used are consistent with sound research design.5 Addition-
ally, the IRB must perform a risk-benefit analysis: it may approve research
only if the IRB determines that the risks are reasonable in relation to antici-
49. 42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (2000).
50. See 45 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Subpart A, Part 46 (2001) (detailing Basic HHS Policy for
Protection of Human Research Participants).
51. In the FDA context, however, IRBs are but one piece of a broader FDA scheme for
evaluating the safety and effectiveness of the products that it regulates.
52. See 21 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Subpart A, Part 56 (2002) (governing composition, opera-
tion, and responsibilities of IRBs).
53. The Common Rule resulted from a White House-convened Interagency Ad Hoc
Committee on Protection of Human Subjects. In 1991, fifteen federal departments and agencies
simultaneously published in the Federal Register the regulations known as the Common Rule.
Each codification of the Common Rule is equivalent to 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (Subpart
A), the HHS codification.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (2001).
55. Id. §46.111(aX).
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pated benefits to individual participants and the importance of the knowledge
that may reasonably be expected to result. 6 The IRB must also ensure that the
selection of participants is equitable," that privacy is maintained,5" and that
data monitoring occurs when appropriate.5 9 Lastly, the IRB must ensure that
the researchers will obtain written informed consent.'
Importantly, the IRB is directed to oversee the informed consent process.
The regulations specify that the informed consent must be obtained under
circumstances that provide the prospective subject the opportunity to consider
whether or not to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or
undue influence.6" Generally, the informed consent process must include the
following:
(1) an explanation that describes the purpose and expected duration of
the research and that identifies the procedures that are experimen-
tal;
(2) a description of the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits and,
where appropriate, a statement that the procedure may involve
unforeseeable risks;
(3) a disclosure of alternative procedures that might be advantageous;
(4) an explanation of whether confidentiality will be maintained;
(5) an explanation of any additional costs to the subject that may result
from participation;
(6) an explanation of whether compensation or medical treatments are
available if injury occurs;
(7) a statement that participation is voluntary and that the subject may
withdraw at any time and an explanation of the consequences of
withdrawal;
(8) a description of the approximate number of participants involved
in the study; and
56. Id. § 46.11 1(aX2). However, the IRB is not supposed to consider possible long-range




60. See id. § 46.11 l(aX4)-(5) (directing compliance with written consent regulations).
An expedited review process is available when the research involves only minimal risk or only
a minor change in previously approved research. Id. § 46.110.
61. Id. §46.116.
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(9) a statement that significant findings that may relate to the subject's
willingness to participate will be provided to the subject.62
The IRB oversees the informed consent process primarily through its approval
of the "informed consent form" that the researcher uses and the participant
signs. " The regulations provide that the IRB may approve a form that embod-
ies the elements noted above that are generally necessary to satisfy the in-
formed consent requirement,' or the IRB can approve a short form stating that
the elements have been presented orally to the participant.
65
Thus, the key protections for human research participants are an assess-
ment by the IRB of the risks, benefits, and design of the research project and
the provision to potential participants of information deemed sufficient by the
IRB to allow potential participants to make an informed decision regarding
participation. Because the IRB's role is critical to protecting human research
participants, it is important to consider the HHS requirements regarding the
composition of the IRB.
The regulations emphasize professional competency and diversity. In
order "to promote complete and adequate review of research activities com-
monly conducted by the institution," the IRB must be "sufficiently qualified
62. Id. § 46.116(a)-(b). The subject should also be informed whom to contact for
answers to questions about the research and the subject's rights. Id. § 46.116(aX7).
The IRB may approve a consent procedure that fails to include the above noted informa-
tion-or may even waive the need to obtain informed consent-if the IRB makes the following
four findings: (1) that the research involves minimal risk, (2) that the waiver will not adversely
affect the rights and welfare of the participants, (3) that the research could not practicably be
conducted without the waiver or alteration, and (4) that the participants will be provided with
pertinent information after participation. Id. § 46.116(d). Informed consent may also be altered
or waived if the research is to be conducted by or subject to approval of state or local govern-
ment officials and is designed to study or evaluate public benefit or service programs. Id.
§ 46.116(c).
63. See id. § 46.117(a) (requiring general use of written consent form).
64. Id. §46.117(b)(1).
65. Id. § 46.117(bX2). If the short form is used, the IRB must approve a written summary
of what is to be said to the subject. Id. Further, a witness must be present for the oral presenta-
tion. Id. The research subject signs only the short form; the witness signs both the short form
and a copy of the summary. Id. A copy of the summary must be given to the research subject
in addition to the short form. Id.
In addition to the informed consent itself, the IRB may waive the requirement that the
researcher obtain a "signed" consent form. Id. § 46.117(c). The IRB may waive the "signing"
requirement when the IRB finds either (1) that the consent document would be the only link
between the subject and the research and the principal risk involved is the potential harm
resulting from a breach of confidentiality or (2) that the research presents only minimal risk of
harm and involves only procedures for which written consent is normally not required outside
of the research context. Id.
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through the expertise of its members."'  Specifically, the IRB must have at
least five members "with varying backgrounds" and with knowledge of
institutional commitments and policies, applicable law, and standards of
professional conduct and practice.67 The regulations stress diversity of
membership, considering race, gender, and cultural backgrounds, in order to
promote respect for its determinations and recommendations.' Further, if the
institution regularly conducts research involving vulnerable categories of
persons, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, or the disabled, the
regulations suggest including one or more individuals who are knowledgeable
about and experienced in working with such individuals.69 The regulations
specifically require each IRB to include at least one member whose primary
concerns are in "scientific areas" and at least one member whose primary
concerns are in "nonscientific areas."7 Further, each IRB must include at
least one member who is not otherwise affiliated with the institution.7'
Although the federal regulatory schemes are substantially similar respect-
ing the composition and operation of the IRB, their processes for oversight are
somewhat different. HHS oversees the IRB process through two agencies
within HHS: the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)72 and the
FDA.73 The OHRP's oversight of IRBs primarily is prospective. As noted, the
regulations require each institution engaged in federally sponsored or sup-
ported research to provide a written "assurance" specifying that the institution
is committed to the human-subject protections specified in the federal regula-





70. Id. § 46.107(c).
71. Id. § 46.107(d). Additionally, the IRB must operate in accordance with written
procedures for conducting initial and continuing reviews. Id. § 46.108(a). Procedures must be
written in order to fulfill the requirement of the assurance of compliance. Id. § 46.103(b)(4).
IRBs may review research proposals only at meetings at which a majority of the members are
present. Id. § 46.108(b). A member whose primary concerns are nonscientific must be present.
Id. To secure approval, research must receive approval of a majority of those members present
at the meeting. Id.
72. The OHRP replaces the Office for Protection from Research Risks. The change was
part of the Secretary of HHS's new initiatives to protect human research participants. The new
office, OHRP, was also moved to the Office of the Secretary, thereby elevating its status within
the Department.
73. The OHRP oversees the process as to research funded by NIH (or conducted or
supported by any federal department or agency). The FDA oversees the process as to research
conducted as part of the FDA approval process for drugs and devices.
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tions.Y The assurance outlines the organization and purview of the IRB in
addition to its processes for reviewing research protocols and other procedural
issues.7" OHRP evaluates all assurances for adequacy in light of the antici-
pated scope of the institution's research activities76 and may approve or
disapprove the assurance or may work with the institution to develop an
acceptable assurance.77 Thus, the focus is on whether the institution has
developed appropriate policies and procedures, and the agency largely trusts
the institution to ensure that its policies and procedures are followed."'
In contrast, FDA oversight is largely retrospective. The FDA oversees
such research through inspections of investigators, IRBs, and research spon-
sors. FDA's goal is to routinely inspect an IRB once every five years.79 The
inspection focuses on a review of IRB records and an examination of written
procedures.8" A goal is to conduct a file review of at least three actual research
studies approved by the IRB to assess things such as timely continuing review,
the use of the most current consent documents, and the submission and review
of adverse-event reports."' Although providing more oversight than a mere
review of the institution's "assurance," a retrospective review is similarly
premised on trust that the institution generally will have ensured that its
policies and procedures were followed.
B. Current Safeguards Against Conflicts of Interest
The regulatory scheme described thus far provides few meaningful
protections against the heightened concerns arising from conflicts of interests.
74. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a) (2001).
75. Id. § 46.103(b). The assurance must state the principles governing the institution in
protecting human research participants, designate one or more IRBs that satisfy the federal
requirements and for which meeting space and staff have been provided, list IRB members and
their qualifications and information pertaining to their relationship with the institution, set forth
the procedures that the IRB will follow in conducting initial and continuing reviews, and
describe the procedures for ensuring prompt reporting to the IRB of unanticipated problems
involving risks or noncompliance. Id.
76. Id. § 46.103(d).
77. Id. § 46.103(e).
78. While the assurances are the primary oversight tool, the OHRP may conduct an
investigation based upon complaints by research participants. However, the OHRP rarely goes
on site; rather, the investigations mostly occur through paper and phone communications. A
Time for Reform, supra note 10, app. at C-2.
79. See id. app. at C-3 (noting that the goal of a routine inspection every five years is
difficult due to workload constraints). However, an inspection may occur as part of the product-
approval process or because of complaints of noncompliance. Id.
80. IRB's Role, supra note 1, app. at B-3.
81. The operation of the IRB process is also reviewed for the presence of a quorum during
voting procedures. Id. app. at B-3, B-4.
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The requirements for the composition of the IRB arguably could provide some
measure of protection. IRB members who have knowledge of institutional
policies and who are qualified to assess the scientific soundness of a proposed
research design conceivably could monitor for signals indicating influence by
financial interests. Similarly, a member not otherwise affiliated with the
institution conceivably could monitor for signals that the university's interests
are influencing IRB decisions. However, one noninstitutional voice can easily
be ignored or outnumbered. Further, evidence shows that institutional IRB
members historically have received insufficient education and training to serve
as effective monitors of conflicts of interests."2
The basic IRB regulations do expressly specify that "[n]o IRB may have
a member participate in the IRB's initial or continuing review of any project
in which the member has a conflicting interest.""3 This requirement provides
some measure of protection: it helps ensure that the IRB review itself is not
improperly influenced by a conflicting financial interest of an IRB member.
But the requirement does not reach the more serious concerns arising from the
increasingly entrepreneurial nature of medical research: the concerns that the
financial interests of the researchers and the university may compromise a
researcher's professional judgment, thereby threatening the integrity of
research design, conduct, or publication.
Importantly, neither the HHS regulations governing NIH-supported
research nor the FDA regulations require IRBs to consider whether the
investigators or the institutions have any financial interest that could be
affected by a proposed research project. Moreover, they do not require that
any conflicting financial interests are disclosed to research participants in the
informed consent process."
Recognizing the growing existence of financial conflicts of interest, HHS
through the Public Health Service (PHS) in 1995 issued regulations that
address financial conflicts of interest more specifically."5 The FDA followed
suit shortly thereafter."6 Although the PHS and FDA regulations are substan-
82. A TimeforReform,supra note 10, at ii.
83. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(e) (2001). The phrase "conflicting interest" is not defined.
84. The common law of some jurisdictions requires as a part of the informed consent
process a disclosure of any personal interests, whether or not related to the patient's health, that
may affect the physician's professional judgment. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (requiring physician to disclose personal economic
interests that may affect his judgment regarding treatment of patient). Thus, while state law may
require such disclosure, the federal regulations do not include such a requirement.
85. These regulations were codified at two locations, one set appearing in the PHS
regulations and the other in the HHS regulations. As the two sets of regulations are substan-
tially similar, this Article will cite the PHS regulations.
86. The FDA's rules are codified at Subchapter A (General), Part 54 (Financial Disclosure
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tially similar, this Article will discuss both. The purpose of both the PHS and
FDA conflict-of-interest regulations is to promote "objectivity" in research by
helping to ensure that the design, conduct, and reporting of research funded
under PHS grants or agreements, 7 or supporting applications for FDA ap-
proval,"' will not be biased by conflicting financial interests of the investiga-
tor. Hence, this Article will refer to the regulations as the "Objectivity Regu-
lations."
The PHS Objectivity Regulations follow the IRB regulatory model: they
impose on the institution an obligation to identify and manage significant
financial interests that research conducted at or for the institution could affect.
Specifically, the Objectivity Regulations impose three primary obligations on
institutions applying for PHS support for research. 9 Institutions must
(1) maintain a written, enforced policy on financial conflicts of interest;
(2) inform research investigators of the institution's policy, of the associated
reporting responsibilities, and of the regulations themselves; and (3) report to
awarding offices the existence of any conflicting interests and assure that the
institution has managed, reduced, or eliminated such interests.'
The institution is directed to accomplish these duties through the designa-
tion of an institutional official(s) who will be responsible for the solicitation
and review of financial disclosure statements from any investigator who is
planning to participate in PHS-funded research.9" The official(s) must identify
whether a conflict exists and, if so, determine what action should be taken to
manage, reduce, or eliminate the conflict. The institution must support the
designated official(s) by providing guidelines for identifying conflicting
by Clinical Investigators) of the FDA regulations (Chapter I, Title 21).
87. 42 C.F.R § 50.601 (2001). The PHS Objectivity Regulations reach NIH-supported
research because within the organizational structure of HHS, the NIH is under the auspices of
the PHS. Notably, the regulations do not reach Small Business Innovation Research Program
Phase I applications. Id. § 50.602. Further, when an individual, rather than an institution, is
the grant applicant, applicability is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
88. 21 C.F.R. § 54.1(a)-(b) (2002).
89. Similarly to the previously discussed HHS regulations, the Objectivity Regulations
define the term "research" to mean "a systematic investigation designed to develop or contribute
to generalizable knowledge relating broadly to public health, including behavioral and social-
sciences research." 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2001).
90. Id. § 50.604(a).
91. Id. § 50.604(b). By the time an application is submitted to PHS, each investigator
who is planning to participate in the PHS-funded research must submit to the designated
official(s) a listing of his/her known significant financial interests that the research for which
the funding is sought might reasonably appear to affect. The listing must include any interests
of the investigator's spouse and dependent children and interests in any entity whose financial
interests the research might reasonably appear to affect. Id. § 50.604(c).
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interests, by taking actions necessary to manage, reduce, or eliminate the
conflict, and by establishing adequate enforcement mechanisms. 92
Obviously, the effectiveness of the Objectivity Regulations depends in
large part on the conflicts encompassed by the regulations. Investigators must
disclose their "significant financial interests," as well as those of the investiga-
tor's spouse and dependent children.93 The Objectivity Regulations define
"significant financial interest" as anything of monetary value, including but not
limited to:
(1) salary or other payments for services (such as consulting fees or
honoraria), unless the payments, when aggregated for the investi-
gator and the investigator's spouse and dependent children over the
next twelve months, are not expected to exceed $ 10,000;9'
(2) equity interests (such as stock, stock options, or other ownership
interests), unless (a) the applicant institution participates in the
Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) or (b) the
equity interest, when aggregated for the investigator and the investi-
gator's spouse and dependent children, does not exceed $10,000
and does not represent more than a five-percent ownership interest
in any single entity;95 and
(3) intellectual property rights (such as patents, copyrights, and royal-
ties from such rights).'
The list prepared by the investigator must include significant financial interests
that "would reasonably appear to be affected by the research for which PHS
funding is sought."'  Applying the guidelines provided by the institution, the
designated official(s) must determine whether the disclosed significant finan-
92. Id. § 50.604(d), (f). The institution must also maintain for three years records of all
financial disclosures and all actions taken by the institution with respect to identified conflicts.
Id. § 50.604(e).
93. See id. § 50.604 (explaining institutional responsibility regarding conflicting interests
of investigators).
94. Id. § 50.603.
95. The value of the equity interest may be determined through reference to public prices
or other reasonable measures of fair market value. Id. The Small Business Innovation Research
Program (SBIR) is the PHS extramural research program for small businesses. Id.
96. Id. However, the provision expressly exempts the following: salary and other
remuneration from the applicant institution; ownership interests in an SBIR applicant institu-
tion; income from seminars, lectures, or teaching engagements sponsored by public or nonprofit
entities; and income from service on advisory committees or review panels for public or
nonprofit entities. Id.
97. Id. § 50.604(cXlXi).
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cial interests could "directly and significantly affect the design, conduct, or
reporting of the PHS-funded research."" As noted, the designated official(s)
must then determine what action should be taken, and the institution must
follow through with enforcement mechanisms.99
Thus, as with the basic IRB and informed consent regulations, the PHS
Objectivity Regulations are grounded in trust. The regulations provide guid-
ance as to the types of interests that an institution must disclose and manage,
but they leave oversight and enforcement to the institution. Further, enforce-
ment of the Objectivity Regulations is comparable to the HHS assurance
process. In each application for PHS funding, the institution need only certify
that it has a written and enforced administrative process to identify and manage
conflicting interests with respect to all research projects for which funding is
sought."° Additionally, the institution must certify that, prior to any expendi-
ture of funds under the award, the institution will report the existence of any
identified conflicting interest and must assure that it will manage, reduce, or'
eliminate the conflict.10' The regulations do not specify additional oversight,
such as an OPHR check on whether an institution's designated official(s) is
properly identifying significant financial interests or even a review of an
institution's written policies and guidelines used in making the determination.
The FDA Objectivity Regulations in some ways go further in regulating
financial conflicts of interest. First, the FDA regulations specify that an
applicant seeking FDA approval of a human drug, a biological product, or a
medical device must submit a list of all clinical investigators identifying those
investigators who are employees of the applicant." 2 Additionally, for each
nonemployee investigator, the applicant must either (1) provide certification
that certain financial arrangements do not exist or (2) disclose the nature of
such financial arrangements and the steps taken to minimize any bias in the
research process. 3 The FDA reviews the disclosures during the course of the
FDA approval process. The regulations specify that the FDA may consider
clinical studies inadequate or unreliable if appropriate steps have not been
98. Id. § 50.605(a).
99. Id. § 50.604(gX2). The institution must certify in each application for funding that,
prior to any expenditure of funds under the award, the institution will report the existence of any
identified conflicting interest and assure that the conflict will be managed, reduced, or elimi-
nated. Id.
100. Id. § 50.604(gXl).
101. Id. § 50.604(gX2).
102. 21 C.F.R. §§ 54.1(aX6), 54.4 (2002).
103. Id. § 54.4. The FDA regulations define "clinical investigator" as "a listed or identified
investigator or subinvestigator who is directly involved in the treatment or evaluation of
research participants... [as well as] the spouse and each dependent child of the investigator."
Id. § 54.2(d).
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taken to minimize bias, including bias that may arise from an investigator's
financial interest in the outcome of the research."° The FDA regulations go
further by departing from the PHS model of leaving oversight and enforcement
to the IRB or to the institution conducting the research: the disclosures are
made to the FDA, and the FDA assesses their impact.
The FDA Objectivity Regulations also define the financial arrangements
or interests that must be disclosed more broadly, in some respects, than do the
PHS regulations. The disclosure must include:
(1) Any financial arrangement between the sponsor of the study and
the clinical investigator whereby the value of the compensation to
the clinical investigator for conducting the study could be higher
for a favorable outcome than for an unfavorable outcome;1
0 5
(2) Any significant payments of other sorts from the sponsor, such as
a grant to fund ongoing research, a retainer for ongoing consulta-
tion, or provision of equipment or honoraria, if the payments have
a monetary value of more than $25,000;1 6
(3) Any proprietary interest in the tested product involved in the
study, such as a patent, trademark, copyright, or licensing agree-
ment;10 7 and
(4) Any significant equity interest in the sponsor of the study, mean-
ing (a) any ownership or financial interests or stock options in a
non-publicly traded entity or (b) any equity interest in a publicly
traded corporation exceeding $50,000, during the time the clinical
investigator is carrying out the trial and for one year following
completion of the trial."~
These arrangements capture some financial interests that have less value than
the interests targeted under the PHS regulations and some only if the value is
significantly greater. For example, under the PHS regulations, payments for
consulting or honoraria must be disclosed when they exceed $10,000, but
under the FDA regulations, similar payments need not be disclosed until they
exceed $25,000. On the other hand, any compensation arrangement that is tied
to a favorable outcome must be disclosed under the FDA regulations, whereas
the PHS regulations do not have a similar provision. Similarly, any equity
104. Id. § 54.(b).
105. Id. §§ 54.4(aX3Xi), 54.2(a).
106. Id. §§ 54.4(aX3Xii), 54.2(0.
107. Id. §§ 54.4(aX3)(iii), 54.2(c).
108. Id. §§ 54.4(aX3Xiv), 54.2(b).
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interest in a non-publicly traded entity must be disclosed under the FDA
provisions, whereas the PHS regulations exempt any equity interest that does
not exceed $10,000 or five-percent ownership interest and exempts ownership
interests in SBIR entities entirely."°
In assessing the financial interests disclosed, the FDA will consider the
steps taken to minimize any bias that could impact the reliability of the study.
The regulations specify that certain study design techniques, such as use of a
sufficient number of investigators without any financial interest, may ade-
quately protect against any bias created by a disclosed financial interest."'
However, if the FDA determines that a serious question regarding the integrity
of the data exists, the FDA can take the steps it deems necessary to ensure
reliability of the data, such as initiating an audit of the study, requesting
further analysis of the data, requiring additional studies to confirm the results,
or rejecting the data as support for FDA approval of the drug or device at
issue."' Thus, FDA enforcement of the Objectivity Regulations also appears
more stringent.
C. The Inadequacies of the Current Safeguards
As explained in Part II, multiple conflicts of interest arise in today's
entrepreneurial research environment, including conflicts affecting IRBs, the
institutions, and the researchers. The basic rules regarding IRB composition
temper only conflicts that may impair the IRB review process itself. The
regulations state that IRB members with a conflicting interest cannot partici-
pate in the approval of a research project that may affect that interest. How-
ever, the regulations provide neither guidance regarding when an interest
should be considered sufficient to create a conflict requiring recusal, nor
guidance for implementing or enforcing the requirement. Rather, the agencies
have elected to trust that IRB members will know when it is appropriate to
remove themselves, and will do so. Further, the requirement of one IRB
member with no affiliation with the institution is likely insufficient to counter
the tensions faced by the other IRB members who are affiliated with the
university and thus who likely feel some obligation to approve research
projects to help the institution. Thus, the basic regulations do little to ensure
the independence of IRBs from the pressures of the institution. Moreover,
they do not require disclosure to human research participants.
109. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exemption of
SBIR entities.
110. 21 C.F.R. § 54.5(b)(2002).
111. Id. § 54.5(c).
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The Objectivity Regulations also contain several deficiencies. Most
significantly, the regulations only require disclosure of financial interests of
the investigators. They do not address financial interests of the university.
Additionally, the regulations use terms that are not only ambiguous, but that
suggest disclosure and management are necessary only if the financial inter-
ests and their potential effect on research reach a fairly high threshold. Under
the PHS regulations, investigators need only disclose "significant" financial
interests, and conflict-of-interest management is necessary only if the interest
is deemed to affect research "directly and significantly."'1 The FDA regula-
tions use the terms "significant equity interest" and "significant payments of
other sorts.
1 13
A related deficiency of the PHS regulations is the exemption for owner-
ship interests in SBIR applicant institutions." 4 An SBIR applicant institution
is one that participates in the Small Business Innovation Research Program.
The SBIR program is the PHS extramural research program for small busi-
nesses." 5 Yet, the emerging financial arrangements often include SBIR-
qualifring small businesses, some of which faculty members own and
operate."6 Thus, the exemption encompasses interests that would seem to
pose very significant financial conflicts. Although the FDA regulations go
further in some respects-for example, the FDA is involved in disclosure,
assessment, and enforcement, and the FDA terms capture some interests
arising from some arrangements no matter how de minimis--deficiencies still
exist. Foremost, the requisite disclosure does not occur until application for
FDA approval-and thus after researchers have performed studies involving
human participants.
In addition, neither set of Objectivity Regulations provide any guidance
regarding how to manage conflicts that have been identified. The PHS
regulations simply state that institutions must assure that they will "manage,
112. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.603, 50.605(a) (2001).
113. 21 C.F.R. § 54.2(b), (f) (2002).
114. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.603 (2001) (listing six exemptions from "significant financial
interest[s]" including exemptions for ownership interests in SBIR applicant institutions).
115. Congress has expressly recognized that the expense associated with research and
development is beyond the means of many small business concerns and that small businesses
are handicapped in obtaining federal funds to support research. Accordingly, Congress
established the policy of giving assistance to small businesses to enable them to undertake and
obtain the benefits of research. 15 U.S.C. § 638(a) (2000). Pursuant to that policy, federal
agencies must help small business concerns obtain government contracts for research and
development. Id. § 638(b). Under the SBIR program, a portion of a federal agency's research
monies must be reserved for award to small businesses. Id. § 638(eX4). The qualifying criteria
for a "small business concern" are set forth at 15 U.S.C. § 632.
116. Diagram A, supra p. 26.
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reduce or eliminate" conflicts, but provide no guidance as to how much a
conflict must be "reduced." 17 Similarly, the FDA regulations require the FDA
to determine whether the interests raise a "serious question" regarding the
integrity of the data, but fail to provide any further guidance.s Finally,
neither set of regulations has expressly required any disclosure to research
participants of financial interests that have the potential to influence objectiv-
ity.
Thus, although the Objectivity Regulations were a step in the right direc-
tion, additional federal safeguards and guidance arguably are necessary. The
inadequacies of the conflict-of-interest regulations have been highlighted by
the recent reports issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of HHS, as
well as by recent media reports questioning the financial interests of investiga-
tors and whether those interests may influence decisions made in the process
of clinical trials. These reports have generated significant response.
IV Emerging Initiatives Relevant to Financial Conflicts of Interest
The response to the OIG reports and media attention has been swift and
fairly voluminous. First, the OIG itself made several recommendations,
relating mostly to conflicts in the IRB process. The HHS quickly followed
with a series of initiatives relating to financial conflicts of interest. The
private sector has also responded, perhaps hoping to head off a stronger
federal role by invigorating the self-regulatory process. These initiatives are
a step in the right direction, but have been insufficient to provide the compre-
hensiveness and uniformity essential to protect human research participants
and to preserve the public trust in the research endeavor.
A. Federal Regulatory Initiatives
1. The Recommendations of the Office of Inspector General: Help
IRBs Do Their Job
In June 1998, the Office of Inspector General extensively studied the role
of IRBs in protecting human research participants and reported that, although
widespread abuses were not found, the IRB system for protecting human
research participants has numerous vulnerabilities that threaten its effective-
ness. The OIG was especially concerned with rising pressures stemming from
the increased commercialization of research and the shift to managed care.
The OIG found that IRBs review "too much, too quickly, with too little
117. 42 C.F.R. § 50.605 (2001).
118. 21 C.F.R. § 54.5(c)(2002).
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expertise," '119 conduct minimal continuing review of approved research, 20
provide little training for investigators and board members, and devote scant
attention to evaluating IRB effectiveness.'
Additionally, the 0IG found that IRBs face serious conflicts of interest,
specifically conflicts resulting from financial interests held by the institu-
tion.122 The 0IG recognized the importance to institutions of research-related
revenue and prestige and the resulting impact on the IRB process. The report
noted that " [tihe institutions expect IRBs to support these interests at the same
time that they protect human participants. The resulting tension can lessen the
IRBs' focus on their basic mission. The minimal 'outside' representation that
typically exists on IRBs deprives them of an important counterbalance to the
institutional interests.' 23 As noted, the current regulatory framework does
little to ensure the independence of IRBs from the pressures of the institution.
Accordingly, the OIG made several recommendations. Because the focus of
the OIG study was on the IRB process, the 0IG recommendations relevant to
conflicts of interest address the concern arising from conflicts affecting the
IRB itself and the IRB approval and oversight process.
First, the GIG made two recommendations regarding explicit federal IRB
criteria. The OIG recommended that federal agencies explicitly require
greater representation on IRBs of nonscientific and noninstitutional members
in order to ensure that their voices and concerns will carry weight in the
review process.'24 Additionally, because the GIG found that most institutions
did not have a formal policy regarding an IRB member with a financial
conflict of interest, the GIG recommended that the regulations be strengthened
to prohibit explicitly IRB members with equity interests related to proposed
research from participating in the IRB process relating to that research.125
Second, in line with the regulatory model used by the agency-the
scheme of leaving oversight and enforcement with the institutions-the GIG
119. The 01G pointed to expanded workloads, resource constraints, a rushed atmosphere
in which sufficient deliberation is often not possible, and insufficient access to scientific
expertise needed to reach informed judgments. A Time for Reform, supra note 10, at ii.
120. The OIG noted that IRBs have little time for continuing reviews other than superficial
reviews of annual reports, adverse-event reports, and protocol amendments. IRB's Role, supra
note 1, at ii. Further, the OI noted that IRBs rarely visit the research site to determine how
the informed consent process works or to review research protocol. Id.
121. The 01G noted that IRBs judge their effectiveness based mainly on the number of
protection lapses or complaints that are brought to their attention. A Time for Reform, supra
note 10, at iii.
122. Id. at ii.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 17-18.
125. Id. at 18.
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urged the agencies to reinforce to universities with IRBs the importance of
ensuring that IRBs have sufficient independence. 126 This recommendation is
premised on the theory that institutions will modify their policies in light of
concerns expressed by the funding agencies. More specifically, the OIG
recommended that IRBs be shielded from pressures to approve protocols by
ensuring that IRBs do not report directly to that part of the institution respon-
sible for bringing in research funds, that members are not compensated based
on the outcome of the review, and that recourse is available should the IRB
feel subject to any institutional pressure.12 If implemented, these practices
would provide a welcome level of independence for the IRB.
The OIG reports created a sense of urgency regarding the need to im-
prove protections for human participants participating in research studies.
The federal agencies responded in several ways. First, the OIG noted in a
June 2000 report that the OHRP and the FDA had stepped up their enforce-
ment activities. 28 Between April 1997 and May 1998, on-site presence at
research institutions significantly increased.'29 Further, since June 1998,
OHRP has conducted off-site investigations (document reviews) at more than
140 institutions and has required seven of them to suspend some or all of their
federally funded research. 30 The OIG has noted that the temporary suspen-
sion of research had a "strong [] sentinel effect," causing many institutions to
reassess their policies and procedures.' More significantly, however, HHS
responded with a number of initiatives of its own.
2. The HHS Initiatives
On May 23, 2000, HHS Secretary Donna Shalala announced several new
initiatives to further strengthen protections for human research participants in
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Dep't of HHS, Office of Inspector General, Protecting Human Research Partici-
pants: Status of Recommendations, Doe. No. OEI-01-97-00197, at 9 (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter
Status ofRecommendations].
129. The report notes:
Between April 1997 and May 1998, the OHRP had conducted an on-site investiga-
tion at only 1 institution. Between June 1998 and March 2000, it conducted on-site
investigations at 10 institutions. FDA's number of routine on-site investigations
of IRBs increased from 213 in fiscal year 1997, to 253 in fiscal year 1998, and 336
in fiscal year 1999.
Id. at 9-10.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 10 (noting that many major medical journals and newspapers gave prominent
attention to OHRP's enforcement actions).
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clinical trials. 32 Importantly, the Secretary's initiatives would go further than
the OIG recommendations and address conflicts of interest held by the univer-
sities and the researchers themselves. In announcing its initiatives, HHS
publicly acknowledged the legitimacy of the concerns raised by the media
regarding the conflicting interests of institutions and of individual
researchers.1
33
To address these concerns, HHS made two moves. 3 First, the Secretary
elevated the status of OHRP by relocating it from NIH to the Office of the
Secretary. 35 Second, HHS announced that it would issue additional guidance
to clarify the Objectivity Regulations and, further, that it would develop new
policies for the broader biomedical research community that would require, for
example, "that any researcher's financial interests in a clinical trial be dis-
132. The initiatives, which are designed to heighten government oversight of biomedical
research and to reinforce to research institutions their responsibility to oversee their clinical
researchers and IRBs, include:
(1) Education and Training. HHS will take steps to require that clinical investigators, IRB
members, and associated IRB and institutional staff undergo continuing education in issues
relating to human participants. Training will be a requirement of all clinical investigators
receiving NIH funds and will be a condition of the NIH grant award process and of the OHRP
assurance process.
(2) Informed Consent. NIH and FDA will issue specific guidance on informed consent,
clarifying that research institutions and sponsors are expected to audit reports for evidence of
compliance with informed consent requirements. Further, for particularly risky clinical trials,
IRBs will be expected to take additional measures, such as third-party observation of the
process.
(3) Improved Monitoring. NIH will require clinical trial monitoring plans for smaller-
scale early clinical trails (Phase I and Phase U1) and will expect investigators to share the plans
with IRBs. Additionally, FDA will issue guidelines for Data and Safety Monitoring Boards
(DSMBs), detailing when they should be required, when they should be independent, their
responsibilities, and other issues.
(4) Civil Monetary Penalties. HHS will pursue legislation to enable FDA to levy
intermediate sanctions, namely, civil monetary penalties-up to $250,000 per clinical investiga-
tor and up to SI million per research institution-for violations of informed consent and other
important research practices. See Press Release, Shalala Bolsters Protections, supra note 40
(summarizing HHS initiatives).
133. Secretary Shalala noted that "the explosion in biomedical research has also brought
new challenges, as more researchers are becoming involved in commercial ventures that may
create new ethical dilemmas." Id.
134. At the same time that the Secretary of HHS was calling attention to the need to
strengthen protections for human research participants, some members of Congress were also
ready to respond. In June 2000, the "Human Research Subject Protections Act of 2000" was
introduced in the House of Representatives. The legislation stalled and has not been addressed
recently.
135. The effective date for the reorganization of the OHRP was June 18, 2000. 65 Fed.
Reg. 37, 136 (June 13, 2000).
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closed to potential participants.' 36 Thus, the Secretary explicitly recognized
the inadequacy of the current informed consent regulations and, more gener-
ally, that the Objectivity Regulations can and should be strengthened.
However, the Secretary was careful to appease constituencies. First, HIHS
signaled that it continued to believe that the primary regulatory responsibility
should lie with the institutions. In the announcement, Secretary Shalala
stressed the responsibilities of the leaders of universities and academic medical
centers in safeguarding the integrity of the research process. Secretary Shalala
stated:
I want to urge university presidents, leaders of our academic medical
centers, and others involved in biomedical research to take a hard look at
oversight of clinical trials, their partnerships with the private sector, their
own ethical guidelines, and the support and guidance they give their
mRs.
137
Because the current regulatory model allows each university to formulate and
implement its own policies and procedures, within the parameters set by
federal regulations, institutions can do more even without agency action to
address the identified deficiencies.
Second, I--S sought institutional input in developing the more stringent
policies. HHS promised to undertake an extensive "public consultation" to
identify new or improved means to manage financial conflicts of interest that
could threaten the safety of research participants or the objectivity of the
research. To that end, HHS held a conference August 15-16, 2000, primarily
to discuss current approaches being taken for dealing with real and potential
financial conflicts of interest at the institutional, IRB, and clinical investigator
level. 3  HHS presented a number of issues relating to conflicting financial
interests and established a period for public comment that was extended to
September 30, 2000. The following subsection reveals the tenor of the com-
ments presented at the Conference.
a. The Conference on Financial Conflicts of Interest: August 2000
The Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial Conflicts of
Interest was held at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland,
on August 15-16, 2000. At the Conference, the various perspectives of the
following groups were presented: the NIH and FDA, the biomedical academic
136. Press Release, Shalala Bolsters Protections, supra note 40.
137. Id.
138. See Conference Notice, 65 Fed. Reg. 41073-102 (July 3, 2000) (discussing plans to
address financial conflicts of interest), available at http://www.ohrp.osophs.dHHS.gov/coi/
frcoi.html.
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community, the biomedical industry, proponents of greater regulation, and
persons who recognize the concerns arising from financial conflicts, but who
question the prudence of greater federal regulation.'39 Interestingly, the
overriding message delivered via the Conference was twofold: (1) financial
conflicts of interest are a very serious problem that must be addressed, but
(2) any initiatives must continue the practice of self-regulation to allow for
diversity in policies and procedures and flexibility in selecting case-by-case
management strategies. The proposals offered in this Article are starkly
contradictory to the latter message of the Conference.
Most Conference participants expressed the view that further federal
guidance on financial conflicts of interest would be appropriate and welcomed.
However, several speakers noted that the federal government should continue
its approach of entrusting institutions with the tasks of formulating policies and
procedures and of providing oversight and enforcement.14 It was stressed that
federal guidance should be flexible and should establish only minimum stan-
dards, thereby allowing individual institutions to devise a process consistent
with unique university cultures and resource constraints. The importance of
the latter was underscored by the uniform recognition that identifying and
managing financial conflicts of interest is an extraordinarily labor- and
resource-intensive endeavor.
Despite the general view that oversight and enforcement should remain
the responsibility of the institutions, participants recognized that leaving these
tasks to the institutions is not a perfect solution given the increasing existence
of conflicting financial interests held by the institution. However, participants
could not envision any effective alternative.
At the Conference, several academic institutions explained the policies
and procedures that they had put in place to monitor and manage conflicting
financial interests. Although the procedures varied considerably, all included
the following key elements:
(1) Disclosure of some or all financial interests held by investigators
and the university;
(2) Review for the purpose of identifying and assessing the nature of
conflicts; and
(3) Management of any conflicts, involving some disclosure through
informed consent plus additional measures when appropriate.
139. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27 (statement of Dr. Stuart Nightingale).
140. The paragraphs in the text represent the author's summary of the many and varied
comments and views expressed at the Conference. Transcripts from the two-day Conference
are available at http://ohrp.osophs.dHHS.gov/coi/ntu.
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 15 (2003)
Some recognized disclosure to and review by a person or entity charged with
identifying financial conflicts as the crux of any procedure designed to address
the problem of conflicts of interest. As aptly noted by the Acting Director of
NIH in discussing the risks posed by financial conflicts, "[Disclosure] is at the
heart of the matter .... It takes more than one person, especially one interested
person, to decide on the innocence of a transaction." 41
The institutions also all agreed that a variety of management tools should
be available to temper the effect of a financial conflict. All agreed that disclo-
sure was appropriate in every case, although variations regarding the form of
and forum for the disclosure existed. Suggested forums included the informed
consent process, the IRB review process, and public records. Further, all
agreed that strategies in addition to disclosure would likely be necessary in
many cases. Common management tools beyond disclosure include the
following: placement of an equity interest or stock into escrow, limitation of
the role of the individual with the conflict, greater oversight of the research
study, and divestiture of the interest or outright prohibition of the arrangement.
Conference participants generally recognized that determining when and
how to use these management tools will be a difficult task involving the
consideration of a multitude of factors. For example, whether an institution
can manage a conflict through greater oversight of the study will depend on the
complexity of the study and the resources available to the institution. Whether
a conflict can be managed by limiting the role of the researcher with the
interest will depend on the extent to which the researcher's technical knowl-
edge is essential to the conduct of the study. Accordingly, participants recog-
nized that the determination of how to manage conflicts should be made on a
case-by-case basis.
Lastly, because of the complexity of the endeavor, participants recognized
that institutions should affirmatively share information about their policies and
procedures and about their experiences in implementing them. The academic
community collectively could then develop workable models for conflict
identification and management.
b. The HHS-OHRP Draft Interim Guidance: January 2001
Following the August 2000 Conference, the HHS Office of Human
Research Protection (OHRP) issued a "Draft Interim Guidance" relating to the
issue of financial conflicts of interest. 4 Notably, OHRP recognized that
141. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27 (statement of Dr. Ruth Kirschstein).
142. Dep't of HHS, Draft Interim Guidance-Financial Relationships in Clinical Re-
search: Issues for Institutions, Clinical Investigators, and IRBs to Consider When Dealing with
Issues of Financial Interests and Human Subject Protection (Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter OHRP
Guidance], available at http://ohrp.osophs.dHHS.gov/nhrpac/mtgl2-00/finguid.htm.
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'"tere are as yet 'no best practices,' and that there is little consensus on what
is 'right' and what is 'wrong' at this time." 43 Further, OHRP reiterated that the
Guidance would not replace or modify any current HHS regulations, policies,
or guidance covering financial conflicts of interest. 44  However, OHRP
decided it was important to offer assistance to institutions, researchers, and
IRBs and to stimulate further development of policies and approaches in the
area.
45
Much of the OHRP Guidance is unremarkable. Indeed, it begins with
what is largely a recitation of the PHS objectivity regulations. First, the
Guidance adopts the PHS's narrow view of the concept of "conflict of inter-
est." 146 Under that view, a conflict of interest exists only when a two prong test
is satisfied: when a designated institutional official(s) reasonably determines
that (1) a "significant financial interest" exits and (2) that interest could "di-
rectly and significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting of PHS-funded
research."'47 The Guidance does not expressly define "significant financial
interest," but presumably the drafters of the Guidance intended to incorporate
the PHS regulation definition. Under the PHS regulations, a significant
financial interest includes (1) salary and other payments for services that
exceed $10,000 over twelve months, (2) equity interests exceeding $10,000 or
representing more than a five-percent ownership interest in any single entity,
and (3) all intellectual property rights."
Second, like the PHS objectivity regulations, the Guidance arguably
continues to allow researchers themselves to apply the first prong in determin-
ing whether a particular financial interest falls within the category of signifi-
cant financial interests and thereby must be disclosed. The Guidance notes that
the institutional policies should be clear regarding who determines whether a
"significant" financial conflict of interest exists.149 However, given the defini-
tion, this recommendation suggests only that the policy should be clear regard-
ing the second prong of the test-namely, who determines whether a disclosed
significant financial interest "could directly and significantly affect [research]
design, conduct or reporting. '
The Guidance goes further than the PHS regulations in two ways. First,
it suggests that institutions consider extending the disclosure requirements to
143. Id. § 1.
144. Id. § 2.
145. Id. § 1.
146. Id. § 1.1.
147. 21 C.F.R. § 50.605(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
148. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (reviewing PHS definitions of
"financial interest").
149. OHRP Guidance, supra note 142, § 1.1.
150. Id.
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researchers conducting studies of FDA-regulated articles, expanding the
category of who must comply with the FDA objectivity regulations that require
disclosure at the time of application for FDA approval.'' Second, the Guid-
ance goes further than the PHS objectivity regulations by implying that a
"financial relationship of any kind" between a clinical investigator and a
commercial sponsor may create a conflict of interest."2 In addition to the
disclosures of "salary or other payments for services" and "equity interests"
that create a significant financial interest, the Guidance states that the conflicts
of Interest Committee should review "any agreements between investigators
and a sponsor" (other than a federal funding agency), including commitments
for financial support unrelated to the study in question.5 3
The Guidance also offers structural recommendations. As to both individ-
ual researcher and institutional conflicts, HHS suggests that institutions
establish independent "conflicts of interest committees" to determine whether
financial arrangements pose conflicts and, if so, how the conflicts should be
managed."4 The Guidance also envisions a strong role for IRBs in dealing
with institutional and individual conflicts. Specifically, the Guidance notes
that "the IRB should review the Institution's financial relationship to the
Sponsor and determine whether the trial should be permitted to be carried out
at the Institution.""' Moreover, as to clinical investigators, the Guidance
suggests that IRBs should repeat the scrutiny conducted by the "designated
institutional officer.'
56
The Guidance includes several suggestions regarding institutional struc-
turing of IRB activity. HHS stresses that institutions should ensure that the
composition of IRBs is such that IRBs can act autonomously, free from institu-
tional pressures. Specifically, HHS emphasizes "broad participation of mem-
bers from outside the institution, who will have no interest in the outcome of
151. Id. § 1.2.
152. Id. § 2.1.
153. Id. §§ 2.1-2.2. Other relationships described in the Guidance include receiving
financial incentives, serving as a paid consultant or speaker on behalf of a commercial sponsor,
and accepting nonmonetary inducements or rewards to investigators or their family members.
Id. § 2.1.
154. Id. § 1.7.
155. Id. §4.1.
156. Id. § 4.3. The Guidance states:
[The IRBI should consider all the elements that a designated Institutional Official
would need to consider under the PHS policies, requirements, guidelines and
guidance as well as FDA Financial Disclosure requirements that are the basis for
submissions to sponsors and then to FDA, and then decide if the protocols and
Consent documents should be modified accordingly.
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the research or the business interests of the institution.'0 7 HHS also suggests
a greater institutional role in monitoring IRB members' potential conflicts of
interest and in educating IRBs and researchers on the issue of financial con-
flicts of interest.'58
In addition to these fairly unremarkable suggestions, the HHS includes in
the Guidance two more striking, prohibitory statements. First, the Guidance
broadly states that "if there are any financial conflict-of-interest issues on the
part of the Clinical Investigator, he or she should not be directly engaged in
aspects of the trial that could be influenced inappropriately by that conflict."" 9
The breadth of this prohibitory statement is affected by the decision to adopt
the PHS's relatively narrow definition of financial conflict of interest, but to
include financial relationships of any kind with commercial sponsors as a
potential conflict. Moreover, the ambiguity of the statement mitigates its force.
It is not clear what constitutes a financial conflict-of-interest "issue," thereby
triggering the prohibition on involvement in research.
Second, the Guidance includes prohibitory language relating to institu-
tional conflicts that is also remarkable, albeit less strongly stated. The Guid-
ance suggests that institutions with a financial interest in the outcome of a
research project should "carefully consider whether a clinical trial to evaluate
safety and efficacy should be performed at that site, and if it should, what
special protections would be needed.' 160 The Guidance notes that the integrity
of the research and thus of the institution
may be best protected by having the clinical trial performed and
evaluated by independent investigators at sites that do not have a
financial stake in the outcome of the trial, or carried out at the insti-
tution but with special safeguards to maximally protect the scientific
integrity of the study and the research participants.
161
B. Private "Self-Regulatory" Initiatives
As stated above, the representatives from the academic institutions
strongly opined at the August Conference that, although federal guidance
would be welcomed, the government should continue its approach of entrusting
institutions with the ultimate task of formulating policies and procedures and
of providing oversight and guidance. They also stressed that federal guidance
should establish only minimal standards, thereby allowing individual institu-
157. Id. § 1.3.
158. Id. §§ 1.4-1.5.
159. Id. § 4.4.
160. Id. § 1.6.
161. Id.
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tions to devise a process consistent with unique university culture and resource
constraints. However, given the complexity of the endeavor, the academic
institutions suggested that they collectively could develop workable models for
conflict identification and management. The academic community has made
some progress toward that goal. First, a group of leading medical schools
agreed on guidelines pertaining to financial conflicts of interest policies.
Second, a leading academic organization, the Association of American Medi-
cal Schools, has issued guidelines and policies addressing individual financial
interests and is drafting guidelines and policies addressing institutional finan-
cial interests.
1. Guidance by Premier Medical Schools: January 2001
In early 2001, the leaders of eight of the nation's top ten NIH-funded
medical schools and another six nationally prominent leaders in academic
medicine issued a set of guidelines intended to "clarify, strengthen, and add
structure" to financial conflicts of interest policies of research institutions. 2
More specifically, the leaders intended the proposals to guide individual
institutions as they revamped their own conflict-of-interest policies and proce-
dures relating to conflicts of researchers, as opposed to institutional conflicts.
The guidelines are a combination of a few specific recommendations and a
number of ideals or guiding principles. The following is a summary of the
most meaningful guidelines on policy issues.
Policies should do the following:
(1) Apply to persons directly involved in the conduct, design, or re-
view of research.
(2) Prohibit involvement in the conduct, design, or reporting of re-
search involving human participants by persons having more than
a clearly defined minimal personal financial interest in a company
that sponsors the research or owns the technology being studied.
(3) Define financial interests clearly and broadly to include any form
of remuneration or special relationships having the potential for
personal material gain.
(4) Clearly delineate the activities and levels and kinds of financial
interests that are and are not permissible and/or that require review
and approval.
162. News Release, Harvard Medical School Office of Public Affairs, Leading NIH-
Funded Medical Schools Agree on Guidelines that Would Strengthen Conflict of Interest
Policies of Virtually All Schools, Hospitals, and Research Institutes (Feb. 8, 2001), available
at http://www.hms.harvard.edu/news/releases/020801 conflict.html.
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(5) Require all individuals who participate in research (of any kind) to
periodically and prospectively disclose all related financial inter-
ests to specifically designated institutional offices and to the re-
search funder.
(6) Require all individuals who participate in clinical research to
disclose related financial interests to IRBs.
(7) Require disclosure to multiple levels within institutions, such as
the Dean (or equivalent individual) and department chairs.
(8) Establish an advisory policy oversight committee (such as a con-
flicts of interest committee), with broad representation of faculty,
administrative staff, and possibly lay representatives, that is
charged with providing oversight of the policies, reviewing indi-
vidual cases involving conflicts, and recommending monitoring
procedures (final authority for monitoring should be the responsi-
bility of the Dean or equivalent individual).
(9) Impose on IRBs the responsibility for ensuring, as the IRBs deter-
mine appropriate, that patients are informed of financial relation-
ships.
(10) Include an explicit policy on disclosure to outside entities.
(11) Require disclosure by all individuals of all related financial inter-
ests in any publications or presentations.
(12) Clearly state procedures for disclosure, review, sanctioning, and
the like.
(13) Ensure coordination amongst offices of the institution dealing with
research and conflicts of interest, including IRBs, offices of tech-
nology transfer, and the like.
(14) Ensure overall institutional compliance through monitoring by the
institution's internal audit mechanisms. 63
Although the guidelines issued by the premier medical schools (PMS
Guidelines) lack specificity, they are nonetheless meaningful. Foremost, the
guidelines recognize that any financial interest may be problematic. The
guidelines therefore recommend mandatory disclosure of "all related financial
interests" by all who participate in research of any kind and recommend a
definition of financial interests that broadly encompasses "any form of remu-
163. Consensus Statement on Conflict of Interest Policies for Academic Institutions (Jan.
23, 2001) (summarizing guidance offered by premier medical schools) [hereinafter Consensus
Statement].
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neration or special relationships"-even those having only the "potential" for
material gain." The recommendations thus appear to allow an institutional
representative, rather than the researchers themselves, to decide whether a
conflict of interest exists. Moreover, like the OHRP Guidance, the PMS
Guidelines take the position that prohibiting involvement in research may be
the best regulatory safeguard when a researcher has more than a "clearly
defined minimal personal financial interest." 6"
The PMS Guidelines are weakened by their continued reliance on tradi-
tional academic culture--namely the notion that each institution must be free
to develop its own specific conflict-of-interest policies-even as to identifying
which financial interests create conflicts of interest.'" The PMS Guidelines
leave crucial decisions in the hands of individual institutions, including the
specific definition of financial interests that must be disclosed and the specific
delineation of activities and levels and kinds of financial interests that warrant
prohibition, rather than mere management. 61 Similarly, the PMS Guidelines
suggest that compliance and enforcement can be effectively monitored "by the
institution's internal audit mechanisms."'" The PMS Guidelines contain no
suggestion of greater enforcement or monitoring by persons or entities external
from the institution.
2. Guidance by the Association ofAmerican Medical
Colleges: December 2001
In October 2000, the President of the Association of American Medical
Colleges (AAMC) established a Task Force to respond to the growing public
concern over financial conflicts of interest in the academic research commu-
nity. 69 The Task Force represented a broad range of interests: the Task Force
was comprised of not only leaders of academic medicine, but also prominent
clinical researchers, patient representatives, former legislators, drug and device
company executives, and journalists.' Similar to the product of the academic






169. Association of American Medical Colleges Task Force on Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Clinical Research, Protecting Participants, Preserving Trust Promoting Progress:
Policy and Guidelines for the Oversight of Individual Financial Interests in Human Partici-
pants Research (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter AAMC Guidelines], available at http://www.
amc.org/members/coi/start.htm. Notably, the Task Force characterizes the problem as the
growing public concern over researchers' "perceived conflicts of interest." Id.
170. Id.
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"model for baseline standards and practices," thereby allowing individual
institutions to implement policies consistent with their unique cultural and self-
governance practices.' The initial product of the Task Force dealt only with
financial interests of individual researchers and administrators. 17 2 In contrast
to the sketchy principles outlined by the leaders of the premier medical
schools, the guidelines issued by the Task Force (AAMC Guidelines) are more
comprehensive and provide greater substantive guidance through both general
and specific recommendations.
The AAMC Guidelines provide the most specific recommendations
regarding three practices that it found should be prohibited. The AAMC
Guidelines provide that medical school policy should prohibit the following:
(1) Payments from the institution or the sponsor to a researcher that are
conditioned upon a particular research result or are tied to success-
ful research outcomes;
(2) Agreements that permit a sponsor or other financially interested
company to require more than a reasonable period of prepublica-
tion review or that interfere with an investigator's access to the
data or ability to analyze the data; and
(3) Agreements that permit a sponsor or other financially interested
company to place restrictions on the activities of students or train-
ees or that bind students or trainees to non-disclosure provisions. 73
The Task Force likely believed it could be specific regarding these prohibitions
because they involve practices on which it may be fair to say that consensus
exists. As to the remainder of the recommendations, it is probably fair to say
that a consensus has not emerged. 4
171. Id.
172. The AAMC Guidelines encompass faculty, staff, employees, students, fellows, and
trainees of member institutions. Id. at 1-2. The AAMC issued its report on "institutional"
financial interests in October 2002. See generally Association of American Medical Colleges
Task Force on Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, Protecting Subjects,
Preserving Trust, Promoting Progress I: Principles and Recommendations for Oversight of
an Institution's Financial Interests in Human Subjects Research (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter
AAMC Guidelines U], available at http://www.aame.org/members/coitf/2002coireport.pdf.
173. AAMC Guidelines, supra note 169, at 19-20. However, the AAMC Guidelines do
not present this as an absolute prohibition. "When deemed unavoidable, such agreements
should be subjected to close scrutiny.... ." Id. at 20. The AAMC Guidelines further note that
"[u]nder no circumstance should a student or trainee be permitted to participate in research if
the terms and conditions of participation would prevent him or her from meeting applicable
institutional degree requirements." Id.
174. Indeed, one member of the Task Force declined to endorse the AAMC Guidelines due
to her concern that the recommendations therein would present a serious impediment to research
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One key difference between the AAMC Guidelines and the principles
articulated by the leaders of the premier medical schools is the Task Force's
decision not to recommend an absolute prohibition on involvement in research
when an impermissible conflict of interest is found to exist. Instead, the
AAMC Guidelines suggest the use of a "rebuttable presumption. ''1 75 At first
blush, the presumption appears very rigorous. The AAMC Guidelines suggest
that institutions establish a "rebuttable presumption that an individual who
holds a significant financial interest in research involving human partici-
pants-whether funded by a public agency, a non-profit entity, or a commercial
sponsor, and wherever the research may be carried out-may not conduct such
research." 76 Closer scrutiny, however, reveals a fairly low level of rigor.
The AAMC Guidelines start from the premise that "significant financial
interests" are only "potentially problematic."'" That is, a conflict of interest
does not arise upon the existence of "any" conflicting financial interest, but
rather only in those cases in which the financial interest is "significant" (as that
term is narrowly defined below). Moreover, the AAMC Guidelines suggest
that even a significant financial interest creates only the "perception of a
conflict of interest."'7 8 The Task Force acknowledged in the AAMC Guide-
lines that "opportunities to profit from research may affect-or appear to
affect-a researcher's judgments... [and that] financial interests... threaten
scientific integrity when they foster real or apparent biases" in the research
process.' 79 However, that is as close as the Task Force came to characterizing
the presence of "any" financial interest as an "actual" conflict.
Another limitation on the rigor of the standard relates to the definition of
"significant financial interest." According to the Task Force, a significant
financial interest includes the following:
(1) Consulting fees, honoraria, gifts, or other emoluments, or in-kind
compensation from an entity with financial interests that would
reasonably appear to be affected by the conduct or outcome of the
research (i.e., a "financially interested company")-but only to the
extent the aggregate amount thereof exceeds $10,000;lIO
innovation. Id. at (i).





180. The aggregate amount includes compensation to be received in the next twelve
months. The exact dollar amount will track the amount set by the PHS regulations. See id. at
13 (defining "significant financial interest").
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(2) Equity interests in a publicly-traded financially interested company
(or entitlements to the same, including stock or stock op-
tions)-but only to the extent that they exceed $10,000 in value or
represent more than a five percent ownership interest (and exclud-
ing interests in publicly-traded, diversified mutual funds);8
(3) Equity interests (including stock options) of any amount in a non-
publicly traded financially interested company;'
8 2
(4) Any royalty income or the right to receive future royalties under a
patent, license, or copyright;
183
(5) Any payments (or entitlements thereto) in connection with the
research that are not directly related to the reasonable costs of the
research, including any bonus or milestone payments in excess of
reasonable costs incurred (and thus excluding payment for reason-
able costs incurred or salary and other payment for services from
the institution); 4 and
(6) Serving as officer or director for a financially interested company,
regardless of compensation."8 5
The Task Force elected to track the current PHS regulations as to the
magnitude of certain financial interests that should be deemed significant.
However, the AAMC Guidelines are more specific than the PHS regulations
in that they make finer distinctions among equity interests and, importantly,
characterize some equity interests as significant regardless of the monetary
amount involved. Further, they designate some additional financial interests
as problematic, for example, receiving any payments not related to reasonable
costs and serving as an officer or director. Thus, the AAMC Guidelines extend
beyond the current regulations.
A more troublesome limitation on the rigor of the AAMC Guidelines
relates to use of the rebuttable presumption against involvement in research.
The AAMC Guidelines suggest that institutions allow a researcher to override
the presumption in "compelling circumstances."'8 6  However, it does not
181. See id. (same).
182. See id. (same).
183. See id. (same).
184. See id. (same).
185. See id. (same).
186. Id. at7.
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appear that it would be very difficult to show that circumstances are compel-
ling. The Guidelines suggest that whether circumstances should be deemed
compelling should depend on "the nature of the research, the magnitude of the
interest... the degree to which it is related to the research, [and] the degree to
which the interest [may be] affected by the research."'8 7 Yet the guidelines
also explain that even "direct" and "lucrative" financial interests may be
justified when, for example, "the individual holding such interests is uniquely
qualified by virtue of expertise and experience and the research could not
otherwise be conducted as safely or effectively without that individual.""'
Given the type of research and innovation frequently involved when poten-
tially lucrative financial interests are at stake, it would seem that researchers
could often make a showing of compelling circumstances to a conflicts of
interest (COI) committee: often it is the researcher with the financial interest
who also has the expertise necessary to conduct the research most "effec-
tively." The AAMC Guidelines attempt to temper this apparent loophole by
stating that the COI committee might approve the involvement of a researcher
with a significant financial interest by imposing "conditions that ensure
effective management and credible oversight of the research."1
8 9
The AAMC Guidelines offer nothing new in the area of oversight and
management. They state the obvious: if a financially interested researcher is
allowed to conduct research involving human participants, the interests and
research "must be managed through rigorous, effective and disinterested
monitoring undertaken by individuals with no financial or professional ties to
the research or direct reporting relationships to the researchers." 9 ° But the
examples that the AAMC provides-such as regular audits of the informed
consent and enrollment process, the involvement of patient representatives
during recruitment and consent, escrow of the financial interest, and use of
data safety monitoring boards'91 -have well-recognized shortcomings. 92
187. Id. at 10-11. In the definitions section, the AAMC Guidelines state that "compelling
circumstances are those facts that convince the institution's COI committee that a financially
interested individual should be permitted to conduct human participants research." Id. In
addition to those listed in the text, the AAMC Guidelines suggest that other factors to consider
are the degree of risk to the human participants involved that is inherent in the research protocol






192. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 353-54 (explaining shortcomings of Data
Safety Monitoring Boards).
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Further, the AAMC Guidelines suggest that the oversight and monitoring
might be performed solely by institutional representatives.'"
Just as importantly, the AAMC Guidelines recommend the practice of
allowing the individual researchers themselves to determine whether a signifi-
cant financial interest exists. The guidelines state that "[i]nstitutional policies
should require full, prior reporting of each covered individual's significant
financial interests that would reasonably appear to be affected by the individ-
ual's research."' 94 The guidelines define "reporting" as the "provision of
information about significant financial interests. . to responsible institutional
officials and to the institutional COI committee."19' Given the more refined
and inclusive definition of "significant financial interests," less discretion lies
with the individual researcher in making the determination of what to report.
The AAMC Guidelines go onto recommend updated reporting." In addition,
the AAMC Guidelines state that "[p]rior to executing a technology licensing
agreement, the Office of Technology Licensing must determine whether the
agreement would create a significant individual financial interest... , and if
so, inform the institution's COI committee of the proposed terms of the
agreement."'19 Thus, the AAMC Guidelines provide at least one independent
check on the discretion accorded to individual researchers to disclose financial
interests that should be characterized as "significant,"
The AAMC Guidelines also continue to recommend the involvement of
the IRB in the process of evaluation and management of financial conflicts of
interest. The guidelines state that the COI committee findings and determina-
tions about significant financial conflicts of interests should "inform the IRB's
review of any research protocol or proposal. "19' The AAMC Guidelines also
suggest that IRBs be allowed a type of veto power by empowering them to
"require additional safeguards or demand reduction or elimination of the
financial interest." '  The guidelines suggest, however, that, between the
193. AAMC Guidelines, supra note 169, at 9. The AAMC Guidelines suggest that
participation of individuals from outside the institution might only become necessary when the
institution itself holds a financial interest. Id. The shortcoming of monitoring as a risk
management technique is discussed infra subsection V.C.3.b.
194. Id. at8.
195. Id. at 12. Reporting also includes "transmission of such information within institu-
tional channels (e.g., from the COI committee to the IRB)." Id. In the section on "process," the
AAMC Guidelines state that institutions "should require covered individuals to report to the
institution all significant financial interests that would reasonably appear to be affected by the
individual's current or anticipated human participants research." Id. at 17.
196. Id. at8.
197. Id. at 17-18.
198. Id. at8.
199. Id.
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findings of the IRB and the COI committee, the "more stringent determination
should be dispositive," and they recommend that institutional policies clearly
designate which institutional officials or committees have the power to make
final and binding decisions.2"0
The AAMC Guidelines also require additional disclosures of the exis-
tence of significant financial interests. First, the guidelines recommend
requiring disclosure to patients in informed consent forms, but leaving the
precise wording of the disclosure to the IRB.2 °1 Second, the guidelines
recommend disclosure to research funders or sponsors, to editors of any
publications to which manuscripts relating to the research are submitted, and
in any substantive oral or written public communication of the research
results.2"
C. Reprise of Key Deficiencies in the Recent Initiatives
A number of specific deficiencies exist in the approaches outlined by the
OHRP and representatives of the academic community, and those deficiencies
were highlighted in the foregoing discussion. Two are most troublesome.
First, the recent initiatives fail to outline a means of accurately or sufficiently
identifying conflicts of interest that should warrant a regulatory response.
Second, the initiatives lack a clear signal as to the most appropriate regulatory
response when a problematic interest is identified. The initiatives suggest that
researchers with significant financial interests should not conduct research
involving human participants. But the guidance also suggests that IRBs and
conflicts of interest committees, or deans or department heads, may stop short
of exclusion of a researcher and select other responses to reduce the effects
of a conflict of interest.
Even more global deficiencies exist. These deficiencies stem from the
adherence to the traditional culture of self-regulation in the academic and
medical arenas. Each set of guidelines issued to date, even that of HHS issued
through OHRP, has been presented as a "model" of recommended practices
and standards, intended to allow individual institutions to implement policies
consistent with unique cultural and self-governance practices and policies.
The result is a wealth of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and variability in
standards and regulatory responses, Moreover, there exists considerable
overlap in the responsibilities of the designated institutional officer, the
conflicts of interest committee, department heads, and IRBs,
200. Id.
201. Id. at 18.
202. Id.
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The result is a recommendation for a complex, confusing, resource-intensive,
yet potentially ineffective system. Even if the system actually reduced the
chance that financial conflicts of interest would influence research, the
recommendations would do little to promote the public trust in the research
endeavor. As some have noted, perhaps the concerns arising from financial
conflicts of interest cannot be entirely eliminated given the incentives created
by the Bayh-Dole Act and other technology-transfer acts.203 But we can surely
do a better job of limiting their negative consequences than the proposals
outlined to date suggest.
V Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory System
The recent suggested policies from the OHRP, the leaders of premier
medical schools, and the AAMC are a move in the right direction. Each has
advanced the discussion and resolution of the concern over the increasing
presence of financial conflicts of interest in the arena of biomedical research
involving human participants. However, more satisfactory and complete
guidelines can be built--ones that draw on the strengths of the recommenda-
tions that have emerged thus far, but that also go further to minimize variabil-
ity and overlapping responsibilities.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to flesh out all aspects of a regula-
tory system for financial conflicts of interest. Rather, this Part of the Article
strives to advance the rulemaking and policy making process by clarifying and
exploring in greater detail selected key issues relevant to regulating financial
conflicts of interest and by highlighting a fundamental structural change that
could greatly improve the process of addressing financial conflicts of interest.
The key issues relate to the degree of federal control, the standards governing
disclosure and management, the appropriateness of various regulatory re-
sponses, and oversight and enforcement responsibilities.
A. Deviate from the Traditional Model of Self-Regulation
The recent guidance from both the OHRP and the academic communities
adhered to the traditional culture of self-regulation. Traditionally, both the
medical and academic communities have been regulated largely through
various models of "self-regulation." In the medical arena especially, various
types of self-regulation exist. For example, state and local governments
typically designate a board of appointed private citizens to certify entry into
203. See Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible
Dreams and Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 148 (2001) (discussing financial
conflicts of interest created by federal technology-transfer acts).
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and to restrict practice of the profession; these boards have relatively plenary
authority to articulate standards and to police and enforce those standards. 2
A less formal type of self-regulation is the voluntary adoption of codes of
ethics by professional associations; such standards are aspirational, policing
is informal, and sanctions are often limited to expulsion from the group.20 5 A
more formal type is sometimes referred to as "audited self-regulation,"
wherein the federal government delegates power to a "self-regulatory organi-
zation" to implement rules, subject to review by a federal agency.2" Programs
of audited self-regulation include use of Joint Commission accreditation as a
condition for hospital participation in Medicare and Medicaid and use of
various types of peer-review organizations to assess whether Medicare ser-
vices are "reasonable and necessary." Although many reasons underlie the
dominance of "self-regulation" in the health care community, it stems largely
from the expertise involved in the practice of medicine and the deference
courts and legislatures traditionally have accorded the exercise of medical
judgment.
Similarly, regulation of institutions of higher education has largely
followed the model of self-regulation. Historically, "[tihe federal govern-
ment's major function regarding post-secondary education has been to estab-
lish national priorities and objectives for education spending and to provide
funds in accordance with those decisions."2 7 Federal aid to post-secondary
institutions is available only to institutions accredited by one of the accredit-
ing bodies recognized by the Secretary of Education; therefore, the federal
government could have been active in establishing the standards used by the
accreditation bodies. Instead, the federal government opted for an audited
self-regulatory approach. The standards used by the accreditation bodies have
been formulated by the private accrediting organizations, subject to a limited
oversight role of the federal government. Moreover, the focus of accreditation
today is on whether an institution complies with its own standards and pro-
gresses toward its own goals. The result has been regulation that has contin-
ued higher education's long tradition of "diversity in and local control over
academic programs."208 The decision to follow the self-regulatory model in
204. See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 177-78 (1995) (contrasting regulation of entry
into professional practice with traditional self-regulation).
205. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical
Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. REV. 341,378 (2001) (defining self-regulation).
206. See Michael, supra note 204, at 175 (defining self-regulation in traditional context).
207. WRnLAMA. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF HIGHEREDUCATION 511 (2d ed. 1985).
208. Michael, supra note 204, at 229 (citing Wn.UAM K. SELDON, ACCREDITATION: A
STRUGGLE OVER STANDARDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 17-20 (1960)).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 15 (2003)
higher education similarly stems from the perceived expertise needed in
making academic decisions, the historical deference to local control over basic
educational decisions, and the existence of expert and reliable accrediting
organizations. 2"
Regulation of biomedical research involving human participants, includ-
ing the regulations addressing financial conflicts of interest, has neatly contin-
ued the tradition of self-regulation. The PHS Objectivity Regulations provide
some guidance as to the types of interests that should be disclosed and man-
aged, but oversight and enforcement policies and procedures are left to the
institution. Further, enforcement of the PHS regulations is part and parcel of
the HHS assurance process. In each application for PHS funding, the institu-
tion need only certify that it has in place a written and enforced administrative
process to identify and manage conflicting interests with respect to all re-
search projects for which the institution seeks funding from the PHS.21
Additionally, the institution must certify that, prior to any expenditure of
funds under the award, the institution will report the existence of any identi-
fied conflicting interest and will assure that the conflict will be managed,
reduced, or eliminated."' The regulations do not specify additional oversight,
such as an OHRP check on whether an institution's designated official(s) is
properly identifying significant financial interests or even a review of an
institution's written policies and guidelines used in making the determination.
The FDA Objectivity Regulations deviate from the traditional model of
self-regulation, but only to a limited extent. The FDA regulations specify that
an applicant seeking FDA approval of a human drug, a biological product, or
a medical device must submit, along with the application, a list naming all
clinical investigators and identifying those investigators who are employees
of the applicant."' Additionally, for each nonemployee investigator, the
applicant either must provide a certification that certain financial arrange-
ments do not exist or, if they do exist, must disclose the nature of the financial
arrangement and the steps taken to minimize any bias in the research
process." 3 The FDA reviews the disclosures during the course of the FDA
209. See id. at 229-30 (discussing move from standardization in higher education).
210. See 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(gX1) (2001) (describing institutional responsibility regarding
conflicts of interest of investigators).
211. See id. § 50.6 04 (gX2) (describing institutional responsibilities).
212. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 54.1(a), 54.4 (2002) (describing certification and disclosure
requirements).
213. See id. § 54.4 (furthering the discussion of certification and disclosure requirements).
The FDA regulations define "clinical investigator" as meaning "a listed or identified investigator
or subinvestigator who is directly involved in the treatment or evaluation of research partici-
pants... [as well as] the spouse and each dependent child of the investigator." Id. § 54.2(d).
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approval process. The regulations specify that the FDA may consider clinical
studies inadequate or unreliable if appropriate steps have not been taken to
minimize bias, including bias that may arise from an investigator's financial
interest in the outcome of the research. 14 Thus, the FDA regulations depart
from the PHS model of leaving oversight and enforcement to the institution
conducting the research or to the IRB: applicants must make disclosures to
the FDA, and the FDA assesses their impact.215 However, neither the FDA
nor the PHS regulations provide any guidance regarding how to manage
conflicts that have been identified. The PHS regulations simply state that
institutions must assure that they will manage, reduce or eliminate conflicts," 6
but provide no guidance, for example, as to how much a conflict must be
"reduced." Similarly, the FDA regulations provide that if certain financial
conflicts exist, the applicant must take steps to minimize any bias-but do not
direct how the institution should control the conflict.
Moreover, the recently issued guidance envisions continued self-regula-
tion. Even the guidance of HHS, issued through OHRP, has been presented
as a "model" of recommended practices and standards, intended to allow
individual institutions to implement policies consistent with unique cultural
and self-governance practices and policies." 7 Indeed, the leaders of the
premier medical schools even favor allowing each individual institution to
define fundamentals, such as which financial interests must be disclosed
and/or further managed or prohibited.21
The time has come to move away from the traditional models of self-
regulation to ensure sufficient and uniform protections from the influence of
financial conflicts of interest. As shown by the contributions of the leaders
of the premier medical schools and the AAMC Task Force, it is probable that
many academic research centers will, even without additional regulation or
guidance, bolster their conflicts of interest policies. However, because
academic research institutions benefit from current technology-transfer
policies, some may be reluctant to provide the vigorous management, over-
sight, and enforcement necessary to preserve integrity and the perception of
214. See id. § 54.1 (b) (stating purpose for financial disclosure by clinical investigators).
215. As explained above, the requisite disclosure does not occur until after an application
for FDA approval of the drug, biological product, or device. Thus, disclosure occurs after
research studies involving human participants have been performed. Supra text accompanying
notes 102-04.
216. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (gX2 ) (2001).
217. See supra text accompanying note 137 (describing BHS belief that regulatory
responsibility should lie with institutions).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68 (enumerating and discussing guidelines
for conflict-of-interest policy from premier medical schools).
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integrity. Additionally, rigorous protections for human research participants
should be uniform across the spectrum of academic institutions. Federal
regulations can more readily ensure sufficient and uniform rigor at all aca-
demic research institutions.
Additionally, the regulated conduct falls outside the sphere of activity
requiring traditional medical and academic expertise. The conduct is perform-
ing research activity involving humans while holding related financial inter-
ests, as opposed to the practice of medicine or academic decisions related to
curriculum. As to research activity and the ability of academic researchers to
make a profit from research being conducted at their academic institutions,
less deference is justifiable. Importantly, the federal government has deviated
from models of self-regulation in the academic and medical arenas when
traditional medical and academic expertise were not at the heart of the regu-
lated activity. For example, the federal government directly regulates physi-
cian referrals to entities in which the physician has a financial interest (the
Stark laws),219 physician billing practices (fraud and abuse laws), 220 and
gender discrimination in athletic programs (Title IX). 22'
Notably, representatives of the academic community who have opined
that the federal government should continue using the audited self-regulatory
approach largely have been concerned with the resource issues. 2  Institu-
tional resources vary considerably. However, as long as the federal regula-
tions dictate a streamlined process, all academic institutions should be able to
handle the resource demands. Further, regulation of financial conflicts of
interest will have a weightier impact on institutions that are more heavily
involved in technology-transfer arrangements, but those institutions will also
likely have larger revenue streams resulting from the transfers, thereby miti-
gating the resource concern. A portion of the profits from research endeavors
could be used to enhance patient protections.
Thus, although the private sector should continue its active involvement
in the development of more rigorous protections against contemporary finan-
cial conflicts of interest, the protections should come primarily in the form of
federal regulations. These regulations should shift away from the traditional
model of self-regulation, clearly specify standards and regulatory responses,
and grant federal agencies more responsibility for monitoring and enforcement
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000) (prohibiting self-referrals).
220. See id. §§ 1320a-7, 1320a-7a, 1320a-7b (providing Medicare and Medicaid "fraud
and abuse laws").
221. See Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
318, 86 Stat. 235 (providing the educational program or activity anti-discrimination law).
222. See supra text accompanying note 140 (describing consensus view at the August 2000
Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial Conflicts of Interest).
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activities. Of course, these regulations should bring within their protective
ambit all research involving human participants, not merely studies currently
subject to federal regulation. However, the focus of this Article, and thus of
the following sections, is on standards, regulatory responses, and enforcement
procedures.
B. Standards
As noted above, a key deficiency of the recent initiatives is the failure to
outline a means of accurately or sufficiently identifying conflicts of interest
that should warrant a regulatory response.223 Both the PHS and FDA Objec-
tivity Regulations turn on the presence of "significant financial interests," as
narrowly defined by the regulations. Only significant financial interests need
be disclosed, and only significant financial interests warrant steps to minimize
bias or to reduce, manage, or eliminate the interest. A sufficiently rigorous
regulatory system would use federal standards that are broader and more
precise, including standards for disclosure and standards for determining
whether any additional regulatory response, beyond initial disclosure, is
appropriate.
1. The Standard for Disclosure
a. The "Actual v. Potential" Issue
Regulators and institutions agree that disclosure is the first step in a
regulatory process addressing financial conflicts of interest. However, the
recent initiatives and the responses thereto reveal that little consensus has
been reached as to what information researchers should initially disclose.
This debate reflects a fundamental issue underlying the problem of financial
conflicts of interest: whether "any" financial interest should be characterized
as creating a "conflict of interest," or whether a conflict arises only when the
financial interest reaches a certain threshold. For example, this debate was an
important aspect of comments made by the National Human Research
Protections Advisory Committee (NHRPAC) in response to interim guidance
issued by HHS.224 The NI-RPAC stated:
NHRPAC encourages the Department to be careful in distinguishing
between a duty to disclose or a process of disclosure of financial interests,
on the one hand, and identification of a financial interest as a conflict of
223. E.g., supra text accompanying notes 149-50, 166-67, and 193-97.
224. See generally Letter from Mary Faith Marshall, Ph.D., Chairperson, NHRPAC, to
Arthur J. Lawrence, Ph.D., Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health (Aug. 23,
2001). The O-RP Interim Guidance is discussed supra notes 142-61 and accompanying text.
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interest, on the other. In many cases ... the term "conflict of interest" has
been used, for example, to signify the presence of any financial interest.
This seems to NHRPAC an inappropriate, inexact and overly broad use of
the term, since mere presence of a financial investment or relationship does
not necessarily result in a meaningful or significant conflict of interest that
must be managed.
25
The NHRPAC went on to suggest that three categories of interests be recog-
nized: (1) at one end of the spectrum, "mere financial relationships;" (2) at
the other end, "well-established conflicts of interests;" and (3) between those
two, "complicating financial relationships," "troubling financial relation-
ships," or "relevant financial relationships."226 While NHRPAC's categoriza-
tion may be relevant at some point in the regulatory scheme, its premise-that
it is not accurate to equate "any financial interest" with a "conflict of inter-
est"-is flawed. In the context of human subject research, any financial
interest constitutes a "conflict of interest" and should be subject to regulation,
although, as explored below, different levels of conflicts may merit different
regulatory responses.
Importantly, none of the recent initiatives strongly favor this broad view
of "conflict of interest." The leaders of the premier medical schools impliedly
suggest that a broad view of conflicts of interest is appropriate through their
recommendation that institutions define "financial interests" broadly to
include any form of remuneration or special relationships having the potential
for personal material gain.227 But the PMS Guidance then recommends
allowing each institution to delineate for itself the activities and levels and
kinds of financial interests that are or are not permissible.22 And the OHRP
and the AAMC Guidelines merely follow the lead of the current conflict-of-
interest regulations by requiring disclosure and management only if the
financial interests and their potential impact on research reach a fairly high
threshold.229 Under the PHS and FDA regulations, investigators need only
225. Letter from Mary Faith Marshall, supra note 224, at 4. The letter continues: "Some
financial relationships are so trivial or so attenuated that they cannot be thought of as posing any
significant risk of 'conflict of interest.' Similarly, moral and regulatory scrutiny is required...
not for any and all 'financial relationships,' but only for those that pose some significant risk
of conflict of interest." Id. at 4-5. This statement seems to blur the issue. A financial interest
can result in a conflict of interest even if that conflict is not "significant."
226. Id.
227. Supra text accompanying note 163.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 163-68 (enumerating and discussing PMS
guidelines).
229. Compare supra text accompanying notes 142-61 (discussing the requirements of
OHRP Guidelines) with supra text accompanying notes 169-202 (discussing the requirements
of AAMC guidelines).
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disclose "significant" financial interests, and management is necessary only
if the interest is deemed to "directly and significantly" affect research.230 As
noted, by following this course, the OHRP and the AAMC Guidelines operate
on the premise that a conflict of interest does not arise upon the existence of
"any" conflicting financial interest, but rather only in those cases in which the
financial interest is significant.
The broad premise that any financial interest creates a conflict of interest
flows from the legal concept of conflict of interest. The concept of conflict
of interest is associated with persons who, by law, are in a position of trust.
Generally, a "conflict of interest" is defined as an interest that is inconsistent
with the official responsibilities of a person in a position of trust.23' Institu-
tions and researchers who carry out federally funded research are persons in
a position of trust. Indeed, the current federal regulations governing research
are based on trust. As explained, the federal regulations require institutions
to "assure" federal agencies that their researchers will comply with the agen-
cies' rules by obtaining approval of research procedures by an IRB before
commencing the research project and obtaining written informed consent from
research participants throughout the project. 32 The requisite "assurance" is
a promise that the institution and investigators can be trusted to review
research prospectively and to follow the rules that have been put in place. 33
Similarly, the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helinski, and the
Belmont Report are premised on the principle that all persons involved in
230. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13 (describing deficiencies in PHS and FDA
regulations).
231. See August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27 (statement of Dr. Thomas
Bodenheimer, Clinical Professor of Family and Community Medicine at the University of
California-San Francisco) (defining conflict of interest). See generally MARC A. RODwIN,
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS (1993). It has been
noted that "the phrase 'conflict of interest' is applied in so many and varied contexts that
providing a single, unitary definition may be impossible." Pilar N. Ossorio, Pills, Bills, and
Shills: Physician-Researcher's Conflict of Interest, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 75, 81 (2001).
Professor Ossorio described two slightly different conceptions of the phrase: (1) situations in
which two interacting parties have opposing interests and (2) situations in which one individual
has interests in opposition to other interests, such that both sets of interests cannot be advanced
simultaneously. Id. at 81-82. Ossorio then notes that "[i]n all or nearly all cases, either of the
two different conceptualizations or formulations ... can be applied to the same set of facts."
Id. at83.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 (describing the "assurance" process used
by WIH).
233. See August 16 Conference Transcript, supra note 30 (statement of Dr. Sugarman,
Associate Professor of Medicine and Philosophy and Director of the Center for the Study of
Medical Ethics and Humanities at the Duke University School of Medicine) (discussing
development of ethical foundations in conflict-of-interest problems).
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research involving human participants-investigators, research staff, institu-
tions, federal and commercial sponsors-are fiduciaries.234 As persons in
positions of special trust, these fiduciaries have special fiduciary duties. In
the context of research, the fiduciary duty imposed would seem to be a duty
to act for the benefit of current and future research participants and for other
individuals who use the knowledge generated by the research.2"' If a "conflict
of interest" is defined as an interest that is inconsistent with the official
responsibilities of a person in a position of trust, then a conflict of interest in
the research context is an interest that is inconsistent with conducting research
for the benefit of research participants and users of generated knowledge.
Conducting research for the "benefit of participants and users" means
ensuring that studies are conducted only when they both provide benefit to the
individual human research subject and contribute to the reservoir of knowl-
edge needed to make scientific advances. 6  IRBs, through their role of
assessing risks and benefits and the soundness of a research design,23 have
traditionally ensured the scientific and medical soundness of a research
project. Additionally, however, conducting research for the benefit of partici-
pants and users means ensuring the integrity and objectivity of the research
process. As the NIH has stressed, "[O]bjectivity of researchers is an essential
value in scientific research and the basis for public trust. Researchers should
be led by their data, not by other interests that might undermine the scientific
integrity of their work."23
234. See, e.g., Belmont Report, supra note 2 (identifying basic ethical principles underlying
research with human participants).
235. See August 16 Conference Transcript, supra note 30 (statement of Dr. Sugarman,
Associate Professor of Medicine and Philosophy and Director of the Center for the Study of
Medical Ethics and Humanities at the Duke University School of Medicine) (discussing
fiduciary obligations in context of research).
236. Professor Pilar N. Ossorio has compiled a more specific list of duties owed to research
participants, as well as to the colleagues of physician-researchers. See Ossorio, supra note 231,
at 87-88 (compiling list of obligations of physician-researchers). Duties to research participants
include engaging patients and research participants in honest and comprehensible informed
consent processes, designing experiments with attention to minimizing harms and risks,
engaging in continuing medical education, and informing proper oversight entities of unex-
pected adverse events that occur during an experiment or in response to a prescription drug.
Id. Duties to colleagues include refraining from knowingly, recklessly, or negligently injecting
false or misleading data into the scientific literature, refraining from knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently engaging in activities that could undermine the public's trust in a department or
institution, and contributing to the growth of scientific knowledge through publication and
participation in professional conferences. Id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 54-65 (discussing the IRB review process).
238. Financial Conflicts of Interests, supra note 46.
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From the perspective of objectivity, a conflict of interest exists whenever
an investigator has more than the normal scientific preference in one outcome
of his research over another outcome.239 Arrangements that give an institution
or an investigator a financial interest in the success of a study would readily
seem to create a situation in which the investigator would prefer one outcome
over another. Thus, financial arrangements of the sort illustrated in the
foregoing sections of this Article readily create "actual" conflicts of interest,
not "potential" conflicts of interest. As noted recently, "The only thing
potential about it is whether the conflict leads to bad research."240 Thus, one
should recognize that any financial interest inherently creates a conflict.
The recognition that an actual conflict of interest creates only the poten-
tial for lack of objectivity does not weaken this conclusion. The existence of
any financial interest, and thus the existence of a conflict of interest, always
creates a probability or likelihood that the researcher will breach a fiduciary
duty. Importantly, that likelihood exists largely as a result of unconscious bias
rather than intentional breach of trust. As Professor Ossorio has noted,
"[C]onflicts would not present much of a dilemma if they only affected a few
'bad apples.' It is because conflicts can influence the many professionals who
have good intentions and good will that we must consider how to minimize
and manage them.
2 41
Unconscious breaches can occur and are difficult to detect because many
decisions in the research process-for example, decisions about study design,
inclusion criteria, and adverse-event reporting-require judgment and discre-
tion. 242 And regulators agree that conflicts can undermine judgment. For
example, commentators have recognized that conflicts can lead to "self-
deception, excessive credulity, and selective attention [and that r]esolution of
the cognitive dissonance created by a conflict may lead a scientist's intuition
to accept results she would otherwise have rejected, or vice versa." '43
239. See August 16 Conference Transcript, supra note 30 (statement of Marcia Angell,
former Editor-in-Chief of The New England Journal ofMedicine) (defining conflict of interest);
see also Ossorio, supra note 231, at 91 (noting that "conflicts of interest are particularly
problematic when they enhance the attractiveness or desirability of one outcome from the
domain of all possible outcomes").
240. August 16 Conference Transcript, supra note 30 (statement of Marcia Angell, former
Editor in Chief of The New England Journal ofMedicine).
241. Ossorio, supra note 231, at 90.
242. See Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Comm. Report, Ethical and Policy Issues in Research
Involving Human Participants (Aug. 2001) (developing ethical system for research with human
participants).
243. Ossorio, supra note 231, at 90 (citing Bernard Barber, Resistance by Scientists to
ScientificDiscovery, in THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 67 (Ruth Ellen
Bulger et al. eds., 1993)). See generally William Broad & Nicholas Wade, Self-Deception and
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Moreover, the existence of financial arrangements that give the re-
searcher a financial interest has given rise to public concern about the integ-
rity of the research process. As noted in the introduction, federal agencies
with authority over federally funded research have an obligation to preserve
not only actual objectivity, but also the perception of complete integrity and
objectivity in research involving human participants. Thus, because concerns
are raised by any financial arrangement that creates an interest in the outcome
beyond the normal scientific preference, it is reasonable to posit that "any"
financial interest should be characterized as a conflict of interest.
b. More Encompassing Initial Disclosure Requirements
As part and parcel of the recognition that "any" financial interest creates
a "conflict of interest," the new federal regulations should follow the sugges-
tion of the PMS Guidance and require disclosure, initially, of all financial
interests held by academic researchers that are related to research being
conducted by the researcher (research in which the researcher participates in
a significant way).244 The goal should be to allow someone other than re-
searchers themselves to conduct the initial scrutiny of a financial interest's
impact on research.
Institutional policy should take the decision of whether to disclose a
particular financial interest out of the hands of the researchers themselves. As
the Acting Director of NIH stated at the August 2000 conference, "[Disclo-
sure] is at the heart of the matter .... It takes more than one person, espe-
cially one interested person, to decide on the innocence of the transaction.""24
Experts recognize that having a financial interest is not in itself wrong.
Rather, the point is that a researcher possessing a financial interest is likely to
be unconcerned, or at least less concerned, because it is likely that the re-
searcher truly, subjectively believes that his financial interest is not going to
impact the study. Yet as noted, the probability that the researcher will breach
Gullibility, in THE ETcIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BIOLOoIcAL SCIENCES 80 (Ruth Ellen Bulger
et al. eds., 1993) (discussing role of judgment in scientific research); Edmond 0. Howe, Inner
Turmoil: An Important Consideration in Conflicts oflnterest, 6 J. CLUNIcAL ETHICS 367 (1995)
(same).
244. The AAMC Task Force determined that the phrase "conducting research" should
broadly include "designing research, directing research or serving as the principal investigator,
enrolling research participants (including obtaining participants' informed consent) or making
decisions related to eligibility to participate in research, analyzing or reporting research data,
or submitting manuscripts concerning the research for publication." AAMC Guidelines, supra
note 169, at 11.
245. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27 (statement of Ruth L. Kirschstein,
M.D., Principal Deputy Director, NIH).
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a fiduciary duty arises upon the existence of any financial interest, due largely
to unconscious bias rather than intentional breach of trust.246 Thus, the
objective should be the disclosure of all financial interests related to research
the researcher is conducting.
In practice, of course, this may be a difficult objective to achieve. One
difficulty involves defining and identifying a "financial interest." The view
recommended by the leaders of the premier medical schools should be fol-
lowed, and institutions should define financial interests broadly, but simply,
as including any form of "remuneration, benefit, arrangement, or relationship
that creates a potential for personal material gain."247 To enhance responses,
institutional policy should also define the term "potential for personal material
gain." For example, the phrase could be defined as "any possibility that you
or your spouse or dependent children could attain a pecuniary or status-related
benefit (other than personnel/academic benefits related to job security or
promotion or tenure)."248 Not only is this definition more encompassing than
the definition of"significant financial interest" used by the PHS, FDA, OHRP,
and AAMC Task Force, but the definition is easier to comprehend because it
omits technical terms such as equity interests, intellectual property rights,
emoluments, or entitlements.249
246. See AAMC Guidelines, supra note 169, at 3 (explaining that public confidence in
research is undermined by any financial conflict of interest).
247. This proposed definition represents the author's adjustments to the broad formulation
advanced by the leaders of the PMS. The "financial" prong of this concept is probably easier
to articulate than the "interest" prong. As Professor Ossorio queried, "Is an interest merely a
desire or the object of a desire? Is it a need? Is it something to advance one's overall welfare
or happiness? What is the relationship of values to interests? Must a person recognize an
interest as something related to her good?" See Ossorio, supra note 231, at 84 (speculating on
the notion of "interests"). Professor Ossorio noted that physician-researchers have numerous
interests that may come into play in a conflict of interest situation and concluded that a theory
stating how to prioritize interests is needed for the resolution of conflicts among them. See id.
at 85-86 (listing and discussing competing interests). "Simply describing interests as organiz-
ing in or attached to the roles of physician and researcher does not necessarily suffice to make
them normatively more important or primary than other interests a physician-researcher might
have." Id. at 87.
248. This proposed definition also represents the author's idea of how to solicit appropriate
disclosures from researchers.
249. This author serves as a member of a conflicts of interest committee at her institution,
which is attempting to draft more comprehensive conflicts of interest policies. Several faculty
on the committee voiced their concern about the detailed and complex definition of "significant
financial conflicts" that must be disclosed. The committee suggested that the complicated
technical information could be provided as additional guidance for those who may be interested,
but felt that most faculty would better understand a broad and simple concept, thereby enhanc-
ing responses.
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A second difficulty is that regulators must take the assessment of whether
a financial interest "relates to research" from the researcher. The only way to
take the assessment completely out of the hands of the researcher would be to
require disclosure of all of the researcher's financial interests, even those not
related to research being conducted by the researcher. Some institutions
appear to have taken such an approach."' However, such expansive disclo-
sure could create substantial burdens for the institution, and faculty research-
ers likely would perceive it as an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Thus,
some institutions have used language requiring disclosure of financial inter-
ests that "to an independent observer would reasonably appear to be affected
by research in which the individual is involved; or that exist in entities whose
financial interests to an independent observer would reasonably appear to be
affected by the research.""' This does not take the assessment of the "relation
to research" entirely out of the hands of the researcher because the researcher
makes the determination whether an "independent observer" would view the
financial interests as being affected by the research. But use of the "independ-
ent observer" language emphasizes more clearly that the researcher should
consider how others might perceive the relationship between the research and
the financial interest.
The combination of phrases should enhance disclosure of information
that the appropriate institutional personnel can then assess for purposes of
identifying whether an additional regulatory response is necessary. The
institutional personnel selected to conduct the initial review of disclosures
should possess enough resources and expertise to make the requisite assess-
ment. Most proposals to date have suggested that institutions should make
two distinct types of appointments: first, appointment of an official, a "desig-
nated institutional official," whose primary job is the initial assessment of
250. For example, State University of New York (SUNY) uses a disclosure statement that
appears to require disclosure of all special relationships (i.e., "any office, trusteeship, director-
ship, partnership, position or consultancy of any type, whether or not compensated, held by you
or your spouse ... with any firm, corporation, association, partnership, or other organization
other than the State University of New York."). Disclosure Statement for Academic Employees
upon Application for a Sponsored Program Grant or Contract, State University of New York
(Sept. 2001) (on file with author). The statement also asks for disclosure of all "warrants or
stocks, and other investments [sic] interests in limited or general partnerships owned by you or
your spouse at time offilingfor research grant. DO NOT LIST AMOUNTS." Id. (emphasis
added).
251. University of Louisville, Draft Policy on Financial Conflicts of Interest: Statement
of Principles and Purpose, Definition of "Statement of Financial Interests" (on file with author).
This language has been suggested for the policy being developed at the University of Louisville.
Id. Other institutions use similar language, but substitute the phrase "that could be perceived
as being affected," for the phrase "that would reasonably appear to be affected." See, e.g., Texas
A&M University, "Significant Financial Interest Certification" (on file with author).
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disclosed interests;252 second, appointment of a committee, frequently referred
to as a "conflicts of interest committee," to scrutinize those financial interests
requiring a more complex assessment.253 As depicted in Diagram B,254 the
proposals suggest ambiguous and overlapping responsibilities. In contrast,
this Article advocates a more streamlined and less resource-intensive ap-
proach, which is discussed in more detail in Part V.255 Accurately identifying
those financial interests that could or should lead to prohibition or manage-
ment and determining when an exception should be granted can be complex
tasks. Thus, because a certain degree of financial or scientific expertise is
required, institutions should be charged not only with the responsibility of
designating a specific official, office, or committee to review financial inter-
ests, but also with the responsibility of ensuring that the designated personnel
possess the necessary competence or qualifications to make a valid assess-
ment.
256
2. The Standard for Additional Regulatory Responses
After disclosure, identifying financial interests that warrant a regulatory
response, interests that this Article will refer to as "problematic interests,"
constitutes the next step. The guidance to date falls short as to the assessment
process. Although the leaders of the premier medical schools recognized that
"any" financial interest should be disclosed257 (and thereby implicitly ac-
knowledged that any financial interest creates a conflict of interest with the
potential to affect research), they elected not to take a position on what types
or levels of financial interests should warrant a regulatory response.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 146-61 (discussing HHS-OHRP proposals).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 189 and 195-200 (summarizing AAMC Guide-
lines conflict-of-interest committee proposal).
254. Supra p. 61.
255. As discussed in Part V of this Article, the author suggests that initial disclosures be
made to an "institutional office," named, for example, the "Office of Financial Conflict Manage-
ment" (OFCM). In contrast to the "designated institutional official" envisioned by the current
regulations and recent initiatives, the OFCM would have primary responsibility and authority
in the assessment, management, and oversight of financial conflicts of interest. Indeed, the
author proposes that a separate "conflicts of interest committee" is not needed. Rather, the
proposed system would have a "Patient and Research Protection Committee" (PRPC). In
contrast to the "conflicts of interest committee" envisioned in the recent initiatives, the role of
the PRPC would be limited to determining whether the rare exception should be granted to the
prohibition on a participation in research by a researcher with a FI/FR.
256. Further, although beyond the scope of this Article, the appointments should take into
account the need to safeguard against institutional conflicts of interest.
257. Supra text accompanying note 164.
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The OHRP and AAMC Task Force provided greater guidance. The
AAMC recommendations describe financial interests and explicitly identify
certain permissible and impermissible financial interests"' Under both the
OHRP and AAMC recommendations, regulatory action is triggered when a
financial interest can be deemed a "significant financial interest.''59  In
addition, OHRP recommends scrutiny of a "financial relationship of any kind"
between a researcher and a commercial sponsor.26° These recommendations,
however, fail to outline a means of accurately or sufficiently identifying
conflicts of interest that should warrant an additional regulatory response
beyond the initial disclosure.
An initial task in identifying such conflicts is to articulate a standard for
problematic financial interests. The standard should reflect the underlying
reason why financial conflicts of interest are cause for concern. As explained,
a conflict of interest exists whenever a researcher has more than a normal
scientific preference for one outcome over another, 26' and any financial
interest constitutes a conflict of interest because a financial interest creates a
possibility that a researcher will breach the research fiduciary duty.262 How-
ever, different levels and types of financial interests create different probabili-
ties of a breach. An appropriate standard for use at the assessment stage, then,
is whether the financial interest creates a reasonable likelihood that the
researcher may fail to fulfill the research fiduciary duty, even if the failure is
unconscious.263 If a "reasonable likelihood" does not exist, the financial
interest should not be considered problematic, and a regulatory response
beyond initial disclosure should not be necessary.
As with any "reasonableness" standard, many factors would seem to be
relevant. This vagueness highlights an important shortcoming of the recent
initiatives' approach to identifying problematic financial interests, even as
258. See supra text accompanying notes 173 and 180-85 (detailing, for example, consult-
ing fees, honoraria, gifts, and permissible interests in publicly traded, diversified mutual funds).
259. See supra text accompanying note 176 (discussing AAMC Guidance); supra text
accompanying note 147 (discussing OHRP Guidance).
260. Supra text accompanying note 152.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 239-43 (describing conflict of interest from the
perspective of preserving the objectivity of researchers).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41 (explaining the argument that the
existence of any financial interest always creates a possibility that the researcher will breach her
fiduciary duty).
263. The phrase "reasonable likelihood" of breach of fiduciary duty has been used by
Professor Ossorio, but not in the context of a standard for identifying financial interests
warranting a regulatory response. Ossorio, supra note 231, at 87. Rather, Professor Ossorio
has used the phrase to describe when conflicts of interests become morally or legally problem-
atic. Id.
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refined by the AAMC Task Force: the failure to consider the multitude of
factors relevant in assessing the seriousness of a conflict and determining
whether it is, in fact, a problematic interest. For example, the current PHS
regulations and the AAMC recommendations predominantly base the determi-
nation of "significant financial interest" on a single factor: the amount or size
of the interest (for example, consulting fees and honoraria exceeding $10,000,
equity interests exceeding $10,000, or equity interests exceeding a five-
percent ownership interest).264 A single factor test results in a fairly clear
standard, and clarity is important. Indeed, the PMS Guidance emphasizes that
point." This, however, sacrifices accuracy. Branding as a conflict of interest
only payments that in the aggregate exceed $10,000 fails to identify problem-
atic interests that arise even when payments, in the aggregate, amount to less
than $10,000. Surely, for some (and perhaps many), a sum of less than
$10,000 may be a sufficiently significant financial interest to warrant a
regulatory response. Realistically, then, the seriousness posed by any finan-
cial interest depends on a number of factors. Relevant factors to consider
would seem to include:
(1) The nature of the relationship between the researcher and the
entity creating the interest (e.g., arms-length v. close and personal,
the extent to which the remuneration depends on certain findings
or outcomes, etc.);
(2) The magnitude of the interest, considering both the amount of
money or remuneration and the researcher's total income other-
wise; and
(3) The discretion to be exercised by the researcher (e.g.,
decisionmaking authority in the research enterprise, amount of
oversight provided, and accountability expected).2"
Those possessing greater financial expertise than this author likely could
identify other relevant factors as well.
Consideration of a number of factors, such as those outlined above,
would more accurately identify those situations in which a financial interest
warrants a regulatory response. However, because a multifactored "reason-
ableness" approach is less clear cut, it would be more resource intensive for
264. Supra text accompanying notes 94-95 (describing PHS Objectivity Regulations);
supra text accompanying 180-81 (describing AAMC Guidelines).
265. See supra text accompanying note 162 (quoting PMS guidelines).
266. See Ossorio, supra note 231, at 90-91 (summarizing factors for determining signifi-
cance of a financial interest).
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the institution. As in so many regulatory situations, a balance must be struck.
Two options exist to strike that balance.
Given the resource limitations of many academic institutions, one option
would be to use a more clear-cut and, thus, less resource-intensive test initially
to identify financial interests that could or should be "presumed permissible,"
thereby reserving the more resource-intensive scrutiny for financial interests
that create a higher likelihood of influence on researcher judgment.267 Finan-
cial interests could be "presumed permissible" when they would seem to
create only a de minimis potential to influence researcher judgment. Such
interests could include, for example, payments or remuneration not exceeding,
in the aggregate, $500 rather than $10,000 or, as suggested by the AAMC,
interests of any amount in publicly traded, diversified mutual funds.'"
The importance of preserving objectivity and human research protections
could justify the resources necessary to conduct a multifactored, and thus
more accurate, assessment of conflicts of interest.269 Further, academic
267. This perspective of financial conflicts is consistent with that proffered by the
NHRPAC when it urged HHS to acknowledge and clarify that three categories of interests
should be recognized: (1) at one end of the spectrum, "mere financial relationships"; (2) at the
other end, "well-established conflicts of interests"; and (3) between those two, "complicating
financial relationships," "troubling financial relationships," or "relevant financial relationships."
Supra text accompanying note 226 (discussing different categories of conflicts of interests).
However, NHRPAC advocated that some financial interests simply do not create "conflicts of
interest." Supra note 225. Here the author is operating from the premise that all financial
interests create a conflict, but advocating that some may be too insubstantial to warrant
regulatory action.
268. The monetary amount selected as the cut-off could even be lower. In the Stark UI
Final Rule, the de minimis exception to the physician self-referral ban (the ban on physician
referrals of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to entities with which the physicians have a
financial relationship) applies only as to compensation in the form of items or services (not
including cash or cash equivalents) that does not exceed an aggregate of $300 per year. 66 Fed.
Reg. 856 (2001). See generally Stark II Final Rule-Phase I A Kinder and Gentler Stark?
2001 HEALTH LAW 1.
269. On the other hand, it is perhaps possible to identify certain financial interests that
could be presumed impermissible. For example, the AAMC Task Force expressly recom-
mended that institutional policies prohibit payments to a researcher that are conditioned upon
a particular research result or tied to successful research outcomes. Supra text accompanying
note 173. It is unclear what this means since many if not most interests are tied, at least
indirectly, to success (e.g., equity interests, royalties). The Task Force Guidelines also recom-
mended prohibiting agreements that permit a sponsor or other financially interested company
to require more than a reasonable period of pre-publication review or that interfere with an
investigator's access to the data or ability to analyze the data. See supra text accompanying
note 173 (describing AAMC Task Force recommendations). As noted, the guidelines do not
present these as absolute prohibitions. "When deemed unavoidable, such agreements should
be subjected to close scrutiny ...." AAMC Guidelines, supra note 169, at 20. But, if specific
arrangements, such as these, can be identified as particularly objectionable due to their enor-
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research institutions ought to be able to allocate (or reallocate) funds to the
process. Although regulations emerging from current conflict-of-interest
discussions may curtail the profits associated with financial interests and
financial relationships, institutions and their researchers will continue to reap
monetary benefits as contemplated by the Bayh-Dole Act and other
technology-transfer acts. Greater benefits will likely flow to those institutions
more heavily involved in financial arrangements, thereby requiring assessment
of a greater number of financial interests. Thus, existing funds could be
tapped to help offset the costs incurred due to the need to protect research
participants as a result of those monetary benefits. Other resources could also
be found. For example, the regulations could require commercial entities that
benefit from ventures with academic research institutions to contribute to-
wards the costs of greater human subject protections.
However, an alternative exists. Rather than using a multifactored ap-
proach, any financial interest not "presumed permissible" could be "deemed
problematic." This approach would solve much of the resource problem by
providing a more bright-line test. For example, payments or remuneration
exceeding, in the aggregate, $500 rather than $10,000 or equity interests of
any amount (aside from interests in publicly traded, diversified mutual funds)
would merit the "deemed problematic" designation. A possible downside to
this approach could be additional regulatory responses imposed due to
nonsignificant financial interests or relationships that have been "deemed
problematic." Given that potential drawback, the feasibility of this alternative
approach depends on the extent to which the regulatory response unduly
burdens innovation. If, as the following analysis suggests, the emerging
regulatory responses likely would have a minimal impact on innovation, using
a "deemed problematic" approach would result in a more streamlined regula-
tory system.
C. The Additional Regulatory Response
Once "problematic conflicts" are identified, such as those financial
interests determined or "deemed" to create a reasonable likelihood of influenc-
ing research judgment, the issue becomes one of choosing the appropriate
additional regulatory response. The current regulations do not articulate this
response with any specificity. The PHS regulations require institutions to
report identified conflicts of interest and assure that the conflicts will be
managed, reduced, or eliminated.27 The FDA regulations require applicants
mous potential to influence researcher judgment, those arrangements could be deemed "pre-
sumed impermissible."
270. Supra text accompanying notes 92 and 101.
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to disclose the nature of financial arrangements and the steps taken to mini-
mize any bias in the research process, but they do not spell out particular
techniques that the applicants should use." '
The recent guidance is more specific. The OHRP Guidelines suggest that
agreements between researchers and institutions concerning commercial
funding of research should be scrutinized to ensure that no other financial
relationships or interests exist."' In addition, the guidance issued by OHRP
states that "if there are any financial conflicts of interest issues on the part of
the Clinical Investigator, he or she should not be directly engaged in aspects
of the trial that could be influenced inappropriately by the conflict."273 The
reports issued by the leaders of the premier medical schools and by the
AAMC Task Force use substantially similar language: both advise prohibit-
ing researchers with problematic financial interests from conducting
research. 4 The reports provide little explanation for this regulatory choice.
The question is whether these types of prohibitions represent an appropriate
regulatory response.
At the broadest level, the options for regulatory safeguards are prohibi-
tion or management. 7 This Article considers the appropriateness of both.
Selecting an appropriate regulatory response requires consideration of three
main factors. The first is effectiveness: does the response tend to protect
human research participants and reduce the potential for breach of the re-
search fiduciary duty? The second factor is cost: will the response be too
resource intensive to be considered a feasible option? The third is the impact
on innovation: will the response significantly hinder the key ingredients
necessary for innovation in the biomedical/biotechnology arena?
271. See supra notes 102-11 (describing FDA Guidelines and various requirements they
impose, none which prescribes how to handle financial interests).
272. See supra text accompanying 151-53 (describing how OHRP guidance goes further
than PHS regulations).
273. OHRP Guidance, supra note 142, § 4.4. The OHRP recommends a similar risk
management technique as to financial interests held by the institution. Id. § 1.6. The OHRP
Guidance recommends that institutions with financial interests should "carefully consider
whether a clinical trial to evaluate the safety and efficacy should be performed at that site.... ";
it further notes that the integrity of the research and thus of the institution "may be best
protected by having the clinical trial performed and evaluated by independent investigators at
sites that do not have a financial stake in the outcome of the trial." Id.
274. Supra text accompanying notes 163 and 176.
275. Further disclosures, for example, through informed consent, are often considered as
an additional regulatory response. However, further disclosures are a subset of conflict
management. See infra subsection V.C.3.a (characterizing further disclosures as subset of
conflict management).
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Although a total prohibition on any financial interest held by individual
researchers is not the appropriate regulatory response, a less stringent prohibi-
tion would be workable-namely, a prohibition on participation in relevant
aspects of a study by researchers holding related problematic financial inter-
ests. Such a prohibition would be more effective than other conflict manage-
ment strategies, without unduly burdening innovation.
1. Prohibition
Some believe that the emerging financial arrangements present such
serious conflicts that prohibition is appropriate. For example, it has been
suggested that investigators who receive grant support from industry simply
should have no further financial ties to those companies276 or that institutions
accepting support from industry should simply prohibit any industry-imposed
restrictions on research design, analysis, or publication. 7
However, these suggestions reveal yet another definitional problem. The
first suggestion purportedly refers to prohibition of any financial interest or
financial relationship between a researcher and a commercial entity sponsoring
research being conducted by the researcher. However, the fact that a commer-
cial entity sponsors the research creates a financial relationship and thus a
financial interest. Indeed, the OHRP guidelines recommend scrutiny of
"financial relationships of any kind between a researcher and a commercial
sponsor. '78 The second suggestion similarly does not refer to prohibition of
a financial interest, but instead refers to prohibition of certain activity when a
financial interest exists. Thus, both suggestions actually refer to conflict or
risk management techniques.
More accurately, the term "prohibition" would mean prohibition of any
financial interest held by a researcher or an academic institution related to the
success of any research study (beyond the traditional financial interests, such
as promotion, tenure, and reputation). This definition would include the
interest created when a commercial entity sponsors research, as well as any
financial interest or financial relationship arising due to an interest in, or
relationship with, a commercial entity that will benefit from the research.
Defined as such, prohibition would obviously be effective in protecting human
research participants and in reducing the injection of bias into the research
276. See, e.g., August 16 Conference Transcript, supra note 30, at 37 (discussing sugges-
tions for prohibitions on investigators).
277. See id. (same).
278. See supra text accompanying note 153 (suggesting scrutiny of researchers and
conimercial sponsors).
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endeavor. If no financial interests exist beyond the traditional ones, contempo-
rary concerns about research integrity would mirror the traditional concerns.279
However, there are problems associated with total prohibition. First,
some commentators suggest that, rather than resolving the problem presented
by conflicts, a total prohibition could actually exacerbate the problem by
driving the fornation and existence of financial arrangements underground.
280
Intertwined with this concern is the notion that financial conflicts of interest
realistically cannot be eliminated. Indeed, where there is a will, there is a way.
But more importantly, a total ban on financial interests would arguably
have too great a negative impact on innovation. As noted by the Acting
Director of NIH,
Profit is what operates a market economy.... It is also the prime motivator
for producing the drugs that improve human health and reduce suffering.
Profit, or making money, generally is not the problem, nor will it ever be.
The problem is the collision of financial considerations, including the desire
for personal or institutional profit, with the essential objectivity of
science.2 1
A total ban or prohibition on any financial interests held by a researcher or
academic institution related to the success of any research study involving
human participants would hinder innovation. Several ingredients are central
to continued biomedical/biotechnology development. As is discussed in more
detail below, innovation depends on the generation of ideas, research and
development, and funding.282 Academic researchers are a prime source of
research ideas. Even without the profits existing in today's more entrepreneur-
ial research environment, academic researchers have and will continue to
formulate ideas. Other incentives, such as promotion and tenure and reputa-
tion, have long existed and continue to exist. However, the ability to profit
through currently allowable financial interests likely spurred the recent bio-
medical and biotechnology explosion, leading to more and better research
ideas. 283 Logically, a prohibition on any financial interests, and thus on the
279. In addition, this total prohibition would not be an overly costly regulatory option.
Researcher disclosures would need to be reviewed for evidence of any financial interest, but if
found, the institution would only need to direct the researcher to divest the interest.
280. E.g., August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 56 (statement of Kenneth
Trevett, General Counsel and CEO of a biomedical research organization in Boston).
281. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 7 (statement of Dr. Kirschstein,
Acting Director of NIH).
282. See supra subsections V.C.2.b.(2), (3) (arguing that prohibition on participation in
research will have minimal impact on innovation, generation of ideas, and conduct of research).
283. Kuhlman, supra note 8, at 342.
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ability to profit from biomedical or biotechnology developments, likely would
hinder innovation.
Moreover, a total prohibition on any financial interests held by a re-
searcher or academic institution related to the success of any research study
involving human participants would hinder innovation much more drastically
than simply prohibiting participation in the research by those with problem-
atic financial interests. As this Article discusses below, prohibiting participa-
tion in related research only reduces profits.284 In contrast, a total prohibition
would eliminate the ability to profit from new advances. If the ability to profit
is eliminated, no incentive would exist for academic researchers to participate
in the risk associated with developing an idea. Yet, academic researchers
often are the persons most likely to understand the potential for profit associ-
ated with new ideas. Indeed, it has been estimated that most breakthroughs
and new devices come on the market as a result of small start-up companies
that may be comprised of, say, a physician and an engineer working together
to develop an idea, rather than as a result of large companies investing large
sums of money in research.2"5
The negative impact on innovation caused by a total prohibition would
hurt the public generally, as well as individual patients who depend on scien-
tific advances. In many areas of medicine, the interventions offered in the
context of controlled clinical trials are the best health care available." Thus,
even if all financial interests could be eliminated, patients and the scientific
process, rather than becoming better off, would arguably ultimately lose out.
Thus, prohibition, in its most technical sense, fails as an appropriate regula-
tory response.
2. Prohibition as a Conflict Management Tool
Any response other than total prohibition is more accurately character-
ized as conflict management. Thus, the prohibitions espoused in the recent
guidance constitute conflict management. For example, the OHRP Guidelines
suggest that agreements between researchers and institutions concerning
commercial funding of academic research should be scrutinized to ensure that
284. See infra text accompanying notes 330-33 (describing spin-out entities).
285. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 38 (statement of James Benson,
Executive Vice President for Technology and Regulatory Affairs at the Advanced Medical
Technology Association); Golden, supra note 35, at 115-20.
286. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of Dr. Raub,
principal spokesperson on the Secretary's new initiatives to strengthen human subject protec-
tion).
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no other financial relationships or interests exist."'7 This is not prohibition in
its most technical sense because the financial interests created by the funding
continue to exist, but the risk is managed by prohibiting any additional finan-
cial interests. Similarly, the guidance issued by OHRP, the reports issued by
the leaders of the premier medical schools, and the AAMC Guidelines recom-
mend prohibiting researchers with problematic financial interests from con-
ducting research.288 These recommendations are also better viewed as conflict
management. The existence of a financial interest is managed by limiting or
preventing participation in research by those holding financial interests related
to the research.
Conflict or risk management is premised on the fact that the presence of
a conflicting financial interest does not automatically lead to bad research.8 9
Rather, a conflict of interest constitutes a "risk factor" for biased research.29
However, because a conflict creates "only a risk," albeit one that can be
deemed "problematic," many believe that "risk management" is a sufficient
regulatory response. At the same time, some believe that even risk manage-
ment will inappropriately hinder innovation if the risk management techniques
used are inappropriate.291 The question thus becomes whether the prohibitions
287. See supra text accompanying note 153 (summarizing OHRP Guidelines).
288. The OHRP recommends a similar risk management technique as to financial interests
held by the institution. The OHRP Guidance recommends that institutions with'financial
interests should "carefully consider whether a clinical trial to evaluate the safety and efficacy
should be performed at that site" and further notes that the integrity of the research and thus of
the institution "may be best protected by having the clinical trial performed and evaluated by
independent investigators at sites that do not have a financial stake in the outcome of the trial."
OHRP Guidance, supra note 142, § 1.6.
289. But see supra text accompanying notes 239-43 (arguing that any financial interest
automatically creates conflict of interest).
290. The following analogy to smoking was made at the August 2000 Conference:
Not everyone who smokes has coronary artery disease. Not everyone with coronary
artery disease smokes. But people who smoke have a greater chance of having
coronary artery disease. Similarly, not all conflict of interest situations create
scientific misconduct. Not all misconduct is associated with a conflict of
interest .... But conflict of interest situations may increase ... the chance of
scientific misconduct ... [such as] designing studies to insure a desired result,
making statements that are not justified by the evidence, publishing only part of the
evidence, suppression of research, or [perhaps] outright fraud or fabrication of
evidence.
August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of Dr. Thomas Bodenheimer,
Clinical Professor of Family and Community Medicine at the University of California-San
Francisco).
291. For example, one member of the AAMC Task Force declined to endorse the report
primarily due to concern that its recommendations would impede research innovation. See
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of the type recommended in the recent initiatives are appropriate risk manage-
ment techniques.
The prohibitions in the recent guidance were noted above:
(1) prohibition on financial interests or relationships between researchers and
a commercial entity sponsoring or funding research (other than the relation-
ship created by the funding itself) and (2) prohibition on participation, in
those aspects of a study that could be influenced improperly, by researchers
holding a financial interest or relationship related to such research.2" In
reality, these two prohibitions constitute but one: Generally, researchers
should not hold financial interests related to research they are conducting,
beyond the financial relationship created when a commercial entity funds the
research. For the reasons outlined, commercial sponsorship itself should not
be prohibited, despite the fact that it at least arguably creates a problematic
conflict. Accordingly, the issue becomes whether it is appropriate to prohibit
a researcher holding a financial interest from participating in related research.
a. Commercial Sponsorship Should Not Be Prohibited
Commercial sponsorship can occur in two types of situations. First,
when a commercial research company generates the innovative idea underly-
ing a research project, that commercial entity can conduct the research itself
or elect to contract with an academic research institution for all or part of the
research. 93 But commercial sponsorship is also possible when researchers
within an academic institution generate the idea underlying the research.294
AAMC Guidelines, supra note 169, at (i) (noting that Susan Hellman, M.D., declined to
endorse the report).
292. Supra Part IV.
293. See, e.g., Michael J. Malinowski, Institutional Conflicts and Responsibilities in an
Age of Academic-Industry Alliances, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 47, 54 (2001) (noting that
"teaching hospitals and acclaimed research centers are beginning to offer clinical research
services to industry in a manner intended to allow them to compete commercially with" contract
research organizations); see also Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in
The American University, 279 SCIENCE 1460, 1460-61 (1999) (noting several reasons for
industry interest), at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/279/5356/1460. Nelsen notes:
Technology is developing too rapidly for in-house development to be sufficient;
central research laboratories with cutting-edge scientists were closed down in the
draconian down-sizing of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and companies are
reluctant to rebuild them; universities have specialized faculties and staff that
cannot readily be obtained elsewhere; and companies can experiment with new
technologies and approaches at universities without committing to hiring perma-
nently the expertise that will be needed to develop these technologies.
Id.
294. See, e.g., Mike Ashley, Ideas In, Cash Out, VIRGINIA Bus., DEC. 1998, at 4 (noting
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Academic researchers may be able to solicit commercial funding, especially
when an arrangement also exists between the institution and a commercial
entity regarding future profits stemming from the research.295
Although commercial sponsorship may create a problematic financial
interest, prohibition of commercial sponsorship itself would not be appropri-
ate. One reason that commercial sponsorship itself may not be problematic,
at least when the commercial entity has merely elected to contract with an
academic institution for research pertaining to an idea generated within the
commercial entity, is that the contract between the commercial sponsor and
the academic institution likely promises merely reasonable compensation for
services rendered. However, it should be acknowledged that commercial
sponsorship may create concerns because obtaining funding for research is
key in the academic research environment. Little internal institutional money
for research remains available today. Instead, federal agencies or commercial
entities largely fund research, and, given the greater competition for the
limited federal funds, institutions are relying more heavily on commercial
sources.296 Although researchers know that future funding depends on quality
research, researchers may also believe, at least unconsciously, that future
funding may be more readily available if the outcome reached will benefit the
commercial entity sponsoring the research.297 Ideally, the researcher's profes-
sional integrity and the knowledge that quality research will keep future
dollars coming will prevail, and in many cases it probably does prevail. But,
as explained, a problematic financial conflict of interest exists when a finan-
that industries are cutting back their research-and-development efforts and that "more and more
engineering and physical science firms, and even software development firms, are looking to
universities").
295. See id. (explaining an arrangement similar to that illustrated in Diagram B, supra
p. 61); see also Baram, supra note 44, at 269 (describing that reporters found that, in the
Gelsinger trial, the University of Pennsylvania received substantial support from a company
founded by the principal researcher and Institute director).
296. Supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
297. E.g., Baram, supra note 44, at 269. Professor Baram notes that evidence supports the
inference that prospects for financial gain have been a root cause of breakdowns in FDA and
NIH sponsored clinical trials:
The inferences are based on the assumption that such researchers and organizations
believe it is in their financial and career interests to compromise safety requirements
in order to speed trials to completion without safety-related interruptions, and to
emphasize positive outcomes . . . [because such outcomes can] stimulate more
private investment and public funding . . . [and enhance the researcher's] .
prospects for continued funding ....
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cial interest creates a reasonable likelihood that the researcher will fail to
fulfill the research fiduciary duty--even if only unconsciously.2
Nonetheless, a prohibition on commercial sponsorship would be difficult
to justify given the lack of certainty that commercial sponsorship by itself
creates a problematic financial interest. However, the existence of any further
financial interests between the researcher and the commercial sponsor would
increase the probability of a breach of the research fiduciary duty and very
likely would raise the probability to or above the level of a "reasonable likeli-
hood." Prohibition of additional financial interests, therefore, is an effective
risk management technique because it minimizes, to the greatest extent practi-
cal, the chance that a researcher's judgment will be compromised when re-
search is commercially funded.
b. Prohibition on Participation in Research Is Appropriate
The prohibitions recommended in the recent guidance boil down to this:
A researcher should not, generally, participate in those aspects of a study that
could be influenced improperly by the researcher's own financial interests. 2
This includes instances in which the researcher has a financial interest3" that
reasonably could appear to be affected by the research or in which the re-
searcher holds financial interests in entities whose commercial success reason-
ably could appear to be affected by the research.3"' This prohibition targets the
financial interests created (other than funding the study itself) when academic
researchers and institutions engage in innovative approaches to financing and
corporate partnering in order to bring an innovation to the market. That is, the
prohibition targets financial interests such as royalty payments, license fees,
and equity interests held by researchers, as well as consulting fees and any
other payments or remuneration related to the research. The question whether
this type of prohibition constitutes an appropriate risk management technique
298. See supra text accompanying notes 261-63 (articulating standard for problematic
financial interests).
299. The PMS Guidance provides that university policies should "prohibit involvement in
the conduct, design, or reporting of research involving human participants by persons having
more than a clearly defined minimal personal financial interest in a company that sponsors the
research or owns the technology being studied." Consensus Statement, supra note 164. The
AAMC Guidelines do not recommend an outright prohibition on participation when an
impermissible conflict of interest exists; but instead suggest that institutions establish a
"rebuttable presumption" that an individual who holds a related, significant financial interest
may not conduct research. Supra text accompanying note 176.
300. That is, an interest beyond the financial interest created when the research is funded
by a commercial entity. Cf supra text accompanying notes 247-49 (discussing definition of
financial interest).
301. Supra text accompanying notes 261-63.
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involves consideration of the three factors discussed above: effective-
ness-whether the prohibition tends to protect human research participants and
reduce the potential for breach of research fiduciary duty, cost-whether the
prohibition will be too resource-intensive to be considered a feasible option,
and impact on innovation-whether the prohibition will significantly hinder
the key ingredients necessary for innovation in the biomedical and biotechnol-
ogy arena.
(1) More Effective and Less Costly Than Other Strategies
A prohibition on participation would be an effective conflict management
strategy for those aspects of a study that could be influenced improperly.
Problematic financial interests are those that create a reasonable likelihood that
a researcher will breach the research fiduciary duty. The potential for a breach
of the research fiduciary duty occurs because a conflict of interest undermines
a researcher's exercise ofjudgment. Thus, the risk posed by holding problem-
atic financial interests is that a researcher's judgment may be undermined.
Logically, then, the prohibition would be effective as it would therefore
eliminate the risk: If the researcher conducting the research is not the re-
searcher holding the financial interests related to the research, those financial
interests cannot impact the aspects of a research study calling for an exercise
of judgment. Further, the prohibition is arguably the most effective strategy
available because other risk management strategies can only reduce the risk;
they cannot eliminate the risk."2
Moreover, the cost associated with the prohibition is minimal and likely
less than the costs associated with other risk management strategies. The key
impact of the prohibition is structural: A researcher cannot hold a financial
interest related to the research he or she is conducting beyond the financial
relationship created if the research is funded by a commercial entity. The
likely consequences would seem to be twofold. More researchers may be-
come involved in the process, or more venture capitalists may become in-
volved in the process. For example, university researchers will generate ideas
and conduct the preliminary underlying research. Then, if the research
produces a technology that is determined to have potential market value (and
therefore to be worth further research and development), arrangements must
be made regarding (1) funding for the requisite research and development and
(2) profit-making from the technology, meaning ownership, patenting, and
licensing considerations. 303
302. See infra subsections V.C.3.a and V.C.3.b for a discussion of the effectiveness of
other strategies such as disclosures and monitoring.
303. See generally Ashley, supra note 294 (describing various means of accomplishing
technology transfer).
PROPOSALS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SCHEME 89
Without prohibition on participation in related research, a university
researcher can become an integral part of a for-profit entity that will take the
technology to the market using the very research conducted by that
researcher." 4 Imposition of a prohibition on participation in the research
would mean that the researcher(s) who initially generated the idea and pro-
duced the potentially profitable technology would have to make a choice. One
choice would be to continue participating in the research, thereby forgoing
opportunities to become part of the commercial venture marketing the technol-
ogy. This would mean that additional venture capitalists would have opportu-
nities to become involved in the process. Another choice would be to become
part of the commercial entity that will take the technology to the market and
potentially reap profits, thereby foregoing participation in future research of
the technology. This would mean that other university researchers, who do
not hold a related financial interest, would become involved in the research.
Such structural modification would seem to involve relatively insignifi-
cant costs for the university. Additional researchers would be brought into the
research process for a given technology, seeming to create an opportunity cost
given that those researchers would then be limited in their work on other
projects. But, those potential opportunity costs would be minimized because
the researcher prohibited from participating due to her related financial
interest can move on to new or different unrelated research projects. Of
course, some opportunity costs may be unavoidable in those cases in which
the additional researchers brought into the process may need to be trained or
allowed some time to gain necessary expertise. However, such cost would
seem to be manageable and, more importantly, less burdensome than the
opportunity costs associated with other risk management techniques such as
monitoring, which is discussed below. Because the prohibition on participa-
tion would be effective and likely would not be too costly, the key issue is the
prohibition's impact on innovation.
(2) Minimal Impact on Innovation
Several ingredients are central to continued innovation in the biomedical
and biotechnology fields. Innovation depends on people generating ideas. 05
These people are physician researchers, engineers, and others such as life
science Ph.D.s."°3 Additionally, innovation depends on research and develop-
ment. Ideas must be converted into products that are tested for efficacy and
304. Supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
305. The term "innovation" herein is understood as referring to the process of commercial-
izing invention." See Golden, supra note 35, at 166 (also using the term in this way).
306. See id. at 145 (describing bioscience Ph.D.s as biotechnology's "inventor class").
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are refined until they are marketable or usable." 7 Both ideas as well as
research and development depend on funding. 8 Moreover, money spent on
innovation in the area of biotechnology is money that might be lost.3" Thus,
arguably, the key ingredient of innovation is someone willing to take a
risk-someone willing to put up the funds necessary to bring an idea to the
market despite understanding the uncertainty of a profit.3"0 Overall, separating
the researcher holding the financial interest from the research itself will not
unduly hinder innovation.
(3) Minimal Impact on the Generation of Ideas
and the Conduct of Research
Under a prohibition on participation, the structural modification is the
separation of the researcher with a financial interest from the researcher
conducting the research. The current regulations do not mandate separation.
The researcher with the idea also may be the researcher with expertise to carry
out the research and development. This same researcher may also have a
financial interest in the success of the innovation and thus the outcome of
research. In most cases, the separation of research duties should not have a
significant impact on the generation of ideas or the conduct of the research,
as long as the researcher with the idea still has the potential to make a profit
and someone else can conduct the research necessary to transform the idea
into a usable product or technology.
First, the prohibition likely would not have a negative impact on the
source of ideas. Ideas fueling innovation have historically come from two
307. See Kuhlman, supra note 8, at 316-19 (noting that the biotechnology industry has
been identified as one of the most capital- and research-intensive manufacturing industries and
that biotech firms average research expenditures of $59,000 per employee, compared with the
corporate average of $7,106).
308. Id. (citing estimates and averages and noting, "The cost of developing and bringing
a product to market is phenomenal.").
309. Id. (observing that research investment in the biotechnology arena is "an expensive
and high-risk endeavor"); see also Golden, supra note 35, at 118 (noting that "[a]lthough some
successful firms have developed profitable product lines, the typical small biotechnology
company has little prospect of producing a commercial product in the immediate future;" and
that "it is generally accepted that most such firms will fail").
310. The investors in small biotech firms are often referred to as "venture capitalists." See,
e.g., Golden, supra note 35, at 139 (noting that funding for basic research in the biotechnology
industry likely comes from venture capital; and that "most biotechnology firms start out as
venture-capital-financed 'spin-outs' from a university or research institute"). This private
investment is essential to the biotechnology industry because "the industry is characterized by
not yet having a base of revenue from existing product sales with which to reinvest into research
and development." See Kuhlman, supra note 8, at 317 n.21.
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primary sources: (1) nonacademic commercial research-and-development
entities and (2) academic research institutions.3"
In nonacademic commercial research entities, the employees internally
generate the ideas. In large traditional research companies, the incentive for
generating ideas comes primarily from traditional employment and compensa-
tion considerations, e.g., retaining "scientific quality" as a primary criteria in
personnel decisions and rewarding general employment performance through
salary increases.312 In some instances, employees may share in the profits,
typically through various types of stock ownership; however, the value of
stock generally is tied to the success of the company as a whole, not to the
success of any one innovation." 3 The prohibition at issue would come into
play only if the commercial entity elects to have academic researchers conduct
the research. The prohibition would preclude any financial interests (beyond
commercial sponsorship of the research) between the commercial entity and
the academic researcher. Thus, although the prohibition would be effective
in preventing possible bias in commercially-sponsored research, it would have
no impact on the generation of ideas in the nonacademic arena because it
would not impact the compensation of employees of commercial entities.
As noted, today's biomedical and biotechnology market promotes the
establishment of small "start-up" companies.314 These companies often focus
on one or a few ideas and/or technologies." 5 To the extent the ideas are
generated internally by nonacademic researchers (meaning the shareholders,
officers and directors, or employees with scientific expertise-who are not
also academic researchers), the analysis would be the same as in the foregoing
paragraph. However, academic researchers are often the sole or major share-
holders, officers or directors, or scientific officers of the small start-up com-
pany, and they are often the creators of the innovative ideas as well.316 In this
311. See Golden, supra note 35, at 132-36 (discussing the "three institutional players in
the 'treble helix' of the United States system of innovation").
312. See id. at 160 (noting that biotechnology firm practice suggests that they "do not
believe that increasing individual rewards for obtaining patents is the best way to motivate
potential innovators;" and citing also NIH practices).
313. See id. (noting that employee-inventors may receive benefits through growth in the
value of their equity interests in the company).
314. See id. at 117-18 (explaining that "in contrast with most research universities and
pharmaceutical companies, biotechnology firms are mostly young, small, and privately held");
id. at 139 (explaining that "most biotechnology firms start out as venture-capital-financed 'spin-
outs' from a university or research institute").
315. See generally Ashley, supra note 294 (describing several small biotechnology firms).
316. See Golden, supra note 35, at 116-17 (noting that "[scientists from major universities]
have played a crucial role in providing [biotechnology] firms with energy, expertise, and ...
scientific legitimacy;" and that "even when not among the founders, [university researchers]
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circumstance, the impact should be assessed as if the idea were generated in
the academic setting.
In the academic research setting, innovative ideas similarly are generated
by employees, primarily faculty of the institution. The historical incentive for
faculty to generate research ideas has been promotion and tenure, and perhaps
additional compensation. Additionally, it has been argued that bio-scientists
are primarily motivated by what have been called "public sector values,"
meaning that they are motivated foremost by the "ethic of contribution" and,
to a lesser extent, by the "economy of credit" in which research is stimulated
by reputational rewards for publication and priority.317 Typically, profits
stemming from research ideas being converted into marketable or usable
products played a negligible role in the generation of ideas. 18 Today, promo-
tion and tenure continue to provide an incentive for research ideas. However,
the potential for profits resulting from transfer-technology acts has greatly
increased the incentive for ideas, thereby diminishing the influence of promo-
tion and tenure in spurring the generation of ideas.319 Further, as opposed to
the traditional commercial research entities-and more akin to the small start-
up commercial companyo-the potential for profits in today's academic setting
is more directly tied to the success of a particular research idea.
Nonetheless, for those aspects of a study that could be influenced im-
properly by a financial interest, the prohibition on participation by an aca-
demic researcher holding a financial interest would not unduly hinder the
generation of ideas. Foremost, the premise that academic scientists are
primarily motivated by the "ethic of contribution" and the "economy of credit"
strongly suggests that elimination of the ability to profit significantly would
only minimally impact the generation of ideas.32 Moreover, researchers could
have been pervasive in their presence-as employees, consultants, or members of the firms'
scientific advisory boards").
317. Id. at 153-56. Golden also explains that the "public sector values" includes some
tendencies be motivated, at least in later stages of a scientist's career, by a more materialist
economy of wealth and power, including the desire to "establish a small academic empire, one
that they seek to sustain and enhance through continual applications for funding and the
acquisition of new equipment and personnel" or to use "science as a route to personal wealth."
Id. at 156-57.
318. Id. at 157 (noting that the potential to profit from patents seems subordinate).
319. See Kuhlman, supra note 8, at 337 (noting the growing concern that researchers
motivated by financial rewards may distort research priorities and that a respected survey
showed that thirty percent of biotechnology faculty with industry support reported that "their
choice of research topics had been influenced by the likelihood that the results would have
commercial applications"); id. at 342 (noting that profit incentive spurs development in
biotechnology).
320. Supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. Golden describes the "ethic of contribu-
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still realize profits, despite a separation of the conduct of the research from the
interest-holding researcher. That is, academic researchers could continue to
structure financial arrangements such that they benefit financially from
developing ideas. For example, even if another researcher conducts the
research, a researcher with an innovative idea could still arrange to be the sole
or major shareholder of a small company that holds the patent or other result-
ing intellectual property rights, or that researcher could hold a license to
market the product.
However, it must be acknowledged that limiting faculty researchers'
roles in academic research would have some financial consequences. The
prohibition would mean that academic researchers with financial interests
would have to limit their roles in the research necessary to develop innovative
ideas. To the extent other researchers serve as, for example, "principal
investigators," the researchers with the ideas may receive less credit from the
academic institution. They may also earn less prestige within the community
of academic researchers. These factors play at least some role in generating
ideas.321 Thus, the question becomes whether this negative impact on ideas
means that the otherwise effective prohibition is rendered inappropriate.
Because the negative impact can be offset, the better view is that the
prohibition should still be considered appropriate. The negative impact on
ideas flows from the potential that the researcher with the idea may receive
less credit from the academic institution or earn less prestige within the
community of academic researchers. That impact can be offset by adjust-
ments to academic policies and procedures. Thus, the federal regulations
should include such a directive to academic institutions, though it would be
appropriate on this issue to allow each institution to devise its own policies,
regarding credit for ideas underlying research when the faculty member is
unable to serve as the principal investigator due to a related financial interest.
If appropriately structured, the prohibition would have a minimal impact on
the generation of ideas.
Second, the prohibition generally should have little impact on the re-
search endeavor itself, unless no other researcher within the institution can
tion" as the scientific ethos of serving others and viewing "discoveries as the common property
of science, with recognition and esteem being the sole external rewards for the discoverer," and
the "economy of credit" as an environment where motivation derives from the "pure personal
enjoyment that many researchers experience in working on an interesting problem [or] making
a discovery," and from the personal satisfaction arising from, e.g., "'beating one's peers either
to the 'right answer' or to the next rung on the academic ladder.'" Golden, supra note 35, at
153-56.
321. See Golden, supra note 35, at 156-57 (explaining that public sector values motivating
academic researchers may include a desire to "establish a small academic empire" or a desire
to achieve recognition and esteem).
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conduct the research necessary to develop the idea or technology. The AAMC
Guidelines explicitly recognize that such a circumstance might occur. Indeed,
that was the premise underlying the AAMC's "rebuttable presumption" that
the research should not be conducted by a researcher with a related financial
interest. The AAMC Task Force recommended allowing the research to be
conducted by a researcher with an interest only if compelling circumstances
are present322-for example, if the research could not occur or could not occur
safely unless the researcher with a financial interest also conducted the
research. Or, for example, if no other researcher within the institution could
conduct the research and develop the idea. In those instances, an absolute
prohibition on participation might inflict too great a burden on innovation.323
However, this author believes that in many, if not most, cases research
likely could be adequately conducted despite a separation of the researcher
with a financial interest from the conduct of the research. The researcher with
the idea who also holds the financial interest often has special expertise
relating to the idea and the research. Yet, generally, other academic research-
ers should be capable of learning what is necessary to conduct those parts of
a study from which the financially interested researcher should be excluded.
Thus, although somewhat more time-consuming and labor-intensive, the
research underlying an innovation generally could be conducted by someone
other than the interest-holding researcher.
Nonetheless, in some rare instances, research perhaps could not occur or
could not occur safely without the participation of the financially interested
researcher. In either case, an exception to the prohibition would be appropri-
ate. The AAMC Task Force suggested that an exception would be appropriate
"when the individual holding [financial] interests is uniquely qualified by
virtue of expertise and experience and the research could not otherwise be
conducted as safely or effectively without that individual." '324 The wording of
the AAMC exception is far too expansive, as it would be relatively easy to
show that the research could not be conducted as "effectively" if the re-
searcher with the idea and the financial interest is prohibited from participat-
ing in the study. For example, it certainly could be considered less effec-
tive-given the additional time and study involved-to require the interested
researcher to teach another researcher what may be necessary to conduct the
research. Any exception to the prohibition should be narrowly worded and
interpreted so as to maintain the protection of the research process and the
322. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (discussing AAMC Task Force
recommendations).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89 (same).
324. AAMC Guidelines, supra note 169.
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safety of the human participants. Further, any case that qualifies for the
exception should be coupled with additional risk-management techniques,
such as disclosure and monitoring. However, if appropriately structured, the
prohibition would have a minimal-or at least acceptable-impact on the
ideas and research essential for biomedical and biotechnology innovation.
(4) The Potential for Profit Still Justifies the Capital Risk
As explained, the key ingredient of innovation arguably is someone
willing to take a monetary risk-that is, someone willing to fund the research
and development necessary to bring an idea to the market, despite the uncer-
tainty of realizing any return on the investment. Historically, the risk inherent
in biomedical/biotechnology research was borne by commercial entities such
as pharmaceutical companies, federal funding agencies, and academic re-
search institutions to the extent that cost shifting could be used to funnel
money toward research.32 Today, academic institutions have fewer avenues
for cost shifting, and greater competition for federal funding exists. Thus,
increasingly the important risk takers are the commercial entities. This
includes both traditional research-and-development companies, such as
pharmaceutical companies, and the emerging small start-up companies whose
necessary capital is often supplied by venture capitalists or other private
investors.326 Academic institutions, which are increasingly involved in
financial arrangements that create a potential for a revenue stream from a
research idea, may also make investments resulting in equity interests for the
institution.
327
The question remains whether the separation of the researcher with a
financial interest from the researcher conducting the research will impact the
availability of research funds from these sources. More stringent regulations
pertaining to financial conflicts of interest are not likely to impact the avail-
ability of federal funding. The federal funding agencies have historically
325. See generally Golden, supra note 35, at 136-43 (describing sources of funding for
technology transfer).
326. The investors in small biotech firms are often referred to as "venture capitalists." See
id. at 139 (noting that funding for basic research in the biotechnology industry likely comes
from venture capital; and that "most biotechnology firms start out as venture-capital-financed
'spin-outs' from a university or research institute"). This private investment is essential to the
biotechnology industry because "the industry is characterized by not yet having a base of
revenue from existing product sales with which to reinvest into research and development."
Kuhlman, supra note 8, at 317 n.21.
327. AAMC Guidelines II, supra note 172, at 6, see also Diagram A, supra p. 26 (illustrat-
ing typical arrangements between academic institutions and for-profit entities).
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borne, and today still bear, the risk associated with innovation as a means of
serving the public interest.
In contrast, commercial entities have always been profit oriented. They
have historically borne, and today still bear, the research-and-development
risk because of the potential for future profits.328 The prohibitions do not
preclude commercial sponsorship. Thus, traditional commercial research
entities will still use academic researchers when that is the more practical and
feasible way to conduct needed research. The prohibition simply precludes
additional financial interests or relationships with the researcher conducting
the study. For example, this would preclude a commercial sponsor from
hiring as a consultant the researcher conducting the research or from paying
an honorarium for the researcher to speak. The impact of such a limitation
may or may not make it more costly overall (and thus less profitable) to
conduct the research and development. It may be more costly, for example,
if the prohibition results in companies having to hire more expensive consul-
tants. However, it would not be more costly if the consulting, speaking, and
other arrangements served primarily as perks for the academic researcher.329
The bottom line is that, although the prohibition may have some effect on the
cost of research, it would not create an undue effect on commercial sponsor-
ship of research.
For the small start-up company without academic researchers as share-
holders, officers or directors, and/or scientific employees, the analysis is
comparable to that of the traditional research company. For small start-up
companies with academic researchers as shareholders, officers or directors,
and/or scientific employees, the analysis is different, but the conclusion
remains the same. As noted, many biotechnology firms begin as venture-
capital-financed spin-outs from universities, and academic research scientists
are often key players in these firms.330 However, in the early stages of exis-
tence, these companies commonly "leverage relatively narrow technical
expertise, as well as intellectual property, for both financing and limited
amounts of revenue."33' That is, it is the patent or license rights that the
company obtains from the university that are key to its success 332 The intel-
328. See Golden, supra note 35, at 133 (noting that the biotechnology industry and its
investors "seek first and foremost to advance their capacity to generate revenues").
329. This is certainly a reasonable inference from the arrangements described in Diagram
A, supra p. 26. See also notes 93-96 and 105-08 (defining significant financial interests in
current federal regulations).
330. Golden, supra note 35, at 139-40.
331. Id.
332. Parents provide a spur to progress through a monopoly grant; indeed, it is recognized
that "patent protection is the lifeblood of modem biotechnology." Id. at 104-05.
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lectual property right is "the inducement and reward" for private investment
notwithstanding the risk. It provides an assurance that if the technology is
successful, the intellectual property rights will protect it from competitors.333
Thus, even in the small start-up company, separation of the researcher
with the financial interest from the researcher conducting the research will not
have a significant impact on funding and private investment. Profits can be
made notwithstanding the prohibition given that it is the intellectual property
rights that secure private venture capital. Additionally, as noted, researchers
who wish to be a part of that potential profit-making venture can make that
choice. That is, a researcher who initially discovers a potentially profitable
technology can elect to forego further participation in the research and be-
come a part of the company that holds the patent or other resulting intellectual
property rights.
In sum, the prohibition on participation in research would not unduly
hinder innovation. It would have a minimal impact on the generation of ideas,
the conduct of the research itself, and the availability of funding sources.
Therefore, it is a change that the medical research community should embrace.
3. Other Risk Management Techniques Are Not as Effective
Additional disclosures and monitoring are two other key strategies
identified to manage the risk of problematic financial interests. Neither
strategy is likely to be as effective as a prohibition on participation.
a. Additional Disclosures
Other articles have considered whether additional disclosure of financial
interests can serve as an effective risk management technique,334 and therefore
this Article will not address the issue in any depth. As explained, a consensus
exists that researchers' disclosure of financial interests to competent institu-
tional personnel is appropriate. Greater debate exists, however, regarding
additional disclosure as a regulatory response. The recent guidance recom-
mends additional disclosure to IRBs,335 disclosure to research participants as
333. Nelsen, supra note 293, at 1460-61.
334. See, e.g., Janet Fleetwood, Conflicts of Interest in ClinicalResearch: Advocating for
Patient-Participants, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 105, 112-14 (2001) (discussing reforms prohibit-
ing financial conflicts of interest); Ossorio, supra note 231, at 76 (considering whether conflicts
of interest undermine integrity and safety).
335. Disclosure to IRBs is appropriate. IRBs should have access to all information relating
to risks involved in the study. However, it is inappropriate to turn the disclosure to IRBs into
a burden imposed on IRBs. The responsibilities for assessing interests, implementing the
regulatory response, monitoring, and enforcement should lie with entities other than IRBs.
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deemed appropriate by IRBs,336 and disclosure to journals and accompanying
public statements, including disclosure at presentations and conferences.337
All of these disclosures would seem to be appropriate in order to protect
patients' autonomy rights,"" as well as the appearance of integrity in research.
However, several barriers prevent disclosure to human participants from
being an effective risk-management technique. Disclosure regarding financial
interests of physician researchers involved in research with human partici-
pants is fraught with all the problems associated with obtaining effective
informed consent. In the context of research, the consent process includes
discussion of the study's "nature, purpose, risks and benefits, along with
alternatives, including standard treatment or non-treatment, and the proposed
intervention's probability of success." '339 Nonetheless, in part because of their
trust in physicians, it is recognized that patients mistakenly and unrealistically
believe that every aspect of the research project will benefit them directly. 4°
Additionally, researchers recognize that patient-participants often fail to
336. An enlightened view of informed consent suggests that patients should have access
to information relating to financial interests held by physician-researchers. The OHRP guidance
recommends disclosure of "the source of funding for the study and the payment
arrangements... during the consent process and in the Consent Form, whenever that informa-
tion is considered to be material to potential participants' decision making process." OHRP
Guidance, supra note 142, § 5.2. The problem is deciding when the information becomes
material. Does the OHRP mean disclosure even if the funding source does not create a
problematic financial interest? The nature of any disclosure to human participants is also
problematic and this author will leave that discussion for another forum.
337. Disclosures to journals in conjunction with public statements, presentations, or
conferences serve a preventative purpose. Public knowledge of financial interests will enhance
the likelihood of greater scrutiny of research results, thereby providing a safeguard against
breaches of research fiduciary duty. See generally Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for
Sale?, 342 NEw ENo. J. MED. 1516 (2000) (describing risks of blurred lines between academic
research and for-profit entities). But see Kenneth J. Rothman, Conflict of Interest: The New
McCarthyism in Science, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2782, 2782-84 (1993) (arguing that strict
conflict-of-interest policies will reduce objectivity).
338. See Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical
Research, 81 B.U. L. REV. 423, 443 (2001) ("[D]isclosure pays the respect that is due to the
autonomy of human participants.").
339. Fleetwood, supra note 334, at 107 (citingADVISORY COMM'N ON HUMAN RADiATION
ExPERzNS,FNALREPORTOFTADSORYCOMM'NONHANRADTIONxPERnENTS
523-25 (1996)).
340. ADVISORY COMM'N ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 339, at 469;
Fleetwood, supra note 334, at 106-07 (citing Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hopes and Best
Data: Consent to Research and the TherapeuticMisconception, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20
(1987)); see also Ruth Faden, Informed Consent and Clinical Research, 6 KENNEDY INST.
ETHIcs J. 356, 359 (1996) (noting studies indicating that patients believe that doctors will
always act in patients' best interests).
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understand the terms used in consent forms, rarely understand the underlying
methodology of the study, and have difficulty assessing the benefits and
burdens.34' As Dr. Janet Fleetwood has noted,
Even when conflicts of interests are disclosed in consent forms, patients
may still be left wondering how to weigh the investigator's
involvement .... It is difficult to imagine patients routinely assessing
whether the financial gains disclosed in a consent discussion are sufficient
to affect the objectivity of their physician. Moreover, if the patient be-
lieves there is a conflict of interest, the patient must then attempt to deter-
mine how to reassess the balance of benefits and burdens of participating
in the study. It is difficult to imagine patients... being able to make these
assessments.342
Thus, many believe that additional disclosure of related financial interests to
participants in human research, although arguably appropriate, is unlikely to
serve as an effective conflict-management strategy. Devising an appropriate
and effective manner and means of disclosure to human research participants
will require greater exploration.
b. Monitoring
Similarly, monitoring as a risk-management technique is likely to be less
effective than prohibiting participation in the research by the researcher
341. Fleetwood, supra note 334, at 108 (citing William C. Waggoner and Barbara B.
Sherman, Who Understands? II: A Survey of27 Words, Phrases, orSymbols Used in Proposed
Clinical Research Consent Forms, 18 IRB 8 (1996)); see also Barrie R. Cassileth et al.,
Informed Consent-Why Are Its Goals Imperfectly Realized, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 896,
896-99 (1980) (discussing patient confusion with consent forms); Christopher K. Daugherty,
Impact of Therapeutic Research on Informed Consent and the Ethics of Clinical Trials: A
Medical Oncology Perspective, 17. CLUNICALONCOLOGY 1601,1602 (1999) (noting thatwhile
required procedures are normally followed, informed consent forms are increasingly incompre-
hensible to patients); Kenneth D. Hopper et al., Informed Consent Forms for Clinical and
Research Imaging Procedures: How Much Do Patients Understand?, 164 AM. J. ROENTGEN-
OLOGY 493,495-96 (1995) (concluding consent forms need to be more readable); H.J. Suther-
land et al., Are We Getting Informed Consent from Patients with Cancer?, 83 J. RoYAL SOC'y
MED. 439, 443 (1990) (showing patients' lack of understanding); Holly A. Taylor, Barriers to
Informed Consent, 15 SEMNARs IN ONcoLoGY NURsNG 89, 90-92 (1999) (discussing effects
that patients' education, illness, relationship with physician, and age have on understanding of
informed consent).
342. Fleetwood, supra note 334, at 109. Dr. Fleetwood's article includes the following
quote: "[In most cases,] the process of obtaining 'informed consent,' with all its regulations and
conditions, is no more than an elaborate ritual, a device that, when the subject is uneducated and
uncomprehending, confers no more than the semblance of propriety on human experimenta-
tion." Id. (quoting F.J. Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED.
465,466 (1972)).
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holding a related financial interest. Monitoring can take several forms, two
of which are currently used, albeit minimally. First, federal regulations
require IRBs to conduct "continuing review" of research that is supported or
regulated by the PHS and the FDA. 43 However, the regulations do not define
the term "continuing review" '4 and provide little guidance beyond the direc-
tive to "conduct continuing review ... at intervals appropriate to the degree
of risk, but not less than once per year," and the grant of authority "to observe
or have a third party observe the consent process and the research." '345 Unfor-
tunately, IRBs have faced considerable criticism regarding their handling of
continuing review.346 Specifically, it has been noted that IRBs "routinely
review only written reports that are submitted by investigators conducting
clinical trials. IRBs do not visit research sites, oversee the informed consent
process, or seek feedback from research participants.""34 Further, IRBs lack
the data and the expertise necessary to conduct meaningful continuing
review. 48  Given the resource limitations and burdens already imposed on
IRBs, strengthening continuing review by IRBs is not likely to be a satisfac-
tory regulatory response.
Another form of monitoring sometimes employed is use of a "Data and
Safety Monitoring Board" (DSMB). As first conceived, DSMBs would
consist of "experts ... [with] no vested interests in the outcome" of research,
who would provide oversight for double-blinded clinical trials.349 The DSMB
would
(1) have access to all data (particularly adverse event data) pertaining to
each subject in the trial; (2) establish "stopping rules" to be applied in the
event that participants on one arm of the study fared much better or much
343. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101-103, 56.109() (2002); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-102, 46.109(e)
(2001).
344. Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional
Review Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REv. 725, 761 (2001) (citing 21 C.F.R.
§ 56.109(f) (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2001)).
345. 21 C.F.R. § 56.109(f) (2002); 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2001).
346. Hazel Glenn Beh, The Role of Institutional Review Boards in Protecting Human
Participants: Are We Really Ready to Fix a Broken System?, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1,
44-45 (2002) (citing NAT'L BIOETHICs ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHIcAL AND PoucY ISSUES IN
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS, at vii (Aug. 2001), available at http://bioethics.
georgetown.edu/nbac/human/overvoll.pdf); Hoffman, supra note 344, at 726.
347. Hoffman, supra note 344, at 726-27 (noting also that only minimal progress had been
made between 1998 and 2000) (citing Status of Recommendations, supra note 128, at 12-13).
348. John L. Mica, Statement Before the House of Representatives Committee on Govern-
ment Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources (May 3,
2000), available at 2000 WL 19303141 (explaining status of IRBs).
349. See id. (describing role of DSMBs).
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worse than participants on the other arm(s) of the study; (3) be authorized
to recommend changes in the study design in order to reduce risks to
participants; and (4) be authorized to update consent procedures to include
risks or benefits that were not initially foreseen.350
By providing continuous analysis of accumulating trial data, DSMBs can
effectively monitor investigator performance and assess the safety of a clinical
trial.
351
The use of DSMBs is still very limited although increasing, especially by
NIH and private-industry sponsors of large, multicentered trials that are
expected to involve significant risks to participants.352 This is due in large
part to the expense involved. IRBs have authority to require approved re-
search studies to utilize DSMBs. However, it has been noted that if an IRB
required DSMB oversight, "the requirement would be tantamount to disap-
proval of the study. 353 DSMBs typically consist of six to eight members
(clinicians and biostatisticians, for example) who meet several times a year,
but who spend numerous additional days examining data. They may be paid
up to $2,000 per day.354 Accordingly, although DSMBs could provide risk
management, they are unlikely to serve as an effective regulatory response as
currently employed.
However, a variation on the idea of the DSMB may provide a more
feasible approach to monitoring as a conflict-management strategy in the
academic research community. This approach would use a rigorous review
of those aspects of a research study that could be influenced by a financial
interest, conducted by two or more institutional researchers without a financial
interest. Like a more formal DSMB, these reviewers would study, from time
to time throughout the trial, central aspects of the project: the research design,
the enrollment process, the informed consent process, the data analysis and
conclusions, and the reporting and publication. Alternatively, an institution
could manage the risk by having a second principal investigator who would
be more directly involved with the research on a day-to-day basis. The second
principal investigator would take an active role in the central aspects of the
research process.
350. Id.
351. See Hoffman, supra note 344, at 762-63 (advocating use of DSMBs) (citing Janet
Wittes, Behind ClosedDoors: The Data Monitoring Board in Randomized Clinical Trials, 12
STAT. MED. 419,420 (1993)).
352. See Mica, supra note 348 (noting limited use of DSMBs).
353. Id.
354. See Hoffman, supra note 344, at 763-64 (describing composition and compensation
of DSMBs).
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 15 (2003)
All forms of monitoring discussed would seem to provide at least some
risk-management benefits. The risk created by allowing research to be con-
ducted by a researcher with a financial interest is that the researcher's judg-
ment may be undermined, thereby impacting the many decisions in the re-
search process that require judgment and discretion. Monitoring by review of
those aspects of a study that turn on the exercise of judgment and discretion
will protect participants and the integrity of the research to the extent that bad
judgment can be detected in time to protect the participants. However,
researchers have noted that detecting errors in judgment by review of informa-
tion is difficult unless the deviation is large.355 Further, harm to participants
may have already occurred by the time a problem is identified. Thus, monitor-
ing through the more direct involvement of a second principal investigator
would seem to provide greater protections than other monitoring strategies.
If a second principal investigator is involved in making judgment calls concur-
rently with the researcher with a financial interest, it would seem more likely
that deviations in judgment could be detected, and detected earlier.
However, no form of monitoring would be as effective as prohibiting the
researcher with the financial interest from participating in the central aspects
of the research. As this Article has already explored, a prohibition on partici-
pation in research by a researcher holding a financial incentive helps eliminate
the risk that the researcher's judgment will be undermined by a conflict. In
contrast, monitoring can at most reduce the risk. Further, monitoring arguably
constitutes a more costly regulatory option. More formal DSMBs involve the
additional expenses discussed above, and with less formal monitoring an
opportunity cost arises because the time of one or more additional researchers
must be devoted to the research affected by the financial interest, rather than
being spent on other research studies. For the same reason, this regulatory
option arguably would have a negative impact on innovation. If more re-
searchers are tied up in the conduct of one research project, fewer research
projects can be conducted.356
D. Structural Enhancements for Disclosure and Management
As explained, the global deficiencies in the recent initiatives stem largely
from the adherence to the traditional model of academic and medical commu-
nity self-regulation. This Article has advocated that, rather than allowing each
academic institution to design its own conflict-of-interest system dependent
355. August 15 Conference Transcript, supra note 27.
356. Notably, these negatives could be minimized if the researcher serving as the second
principal investigator, although possessing solid research knowledge and skills, perhaps lacks
the creativity and the desire to be actively involved in innovation.
PROPOSALS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SCHEME 103
on the unique cultural and governance practices at the institution, the federal
regulations should direct each institution to follow a largely uniform disclo-
sure, management, and oversight system using mandated federal standards and
regulatory responses as outlined in the foregoing sections. Protections for
human research participants should be rigorous and uniform from institution
to institution. Further, uniformity will also enhance the ability of the federal
agencies to monitor compliance with the mandated protections. However,
because resources do vary from institution to institution, the mandated system
should be streamlined to minimize complexities.
Complexities can be minimized by using the suggestions already pre-
sented in this Article: (1) requiring disclosures of all financial interests
related to research at the institution, (2) adopting the "deemed problematic"
approach to assessing financial interests, and (3) using as the primary conflict-
management technique the prohibition on research participation by research-
ers holding problematic financial interests (absent truly compelling circum-
stances).
The system can be streamlined by clearly establishing discrete responsi-
bilities at each stage of the system and by ensuring that those responsibilities
are delegated to entities with appropriate and focused expertise. As noted
above, the recent initiatives suggest considerable overlap in the responsibili-
ties of the "designated institutional officer," the "conflicts of interest commit-
tee," the department heads, and the IRBs. Importantly, it is beyond the scope
of this Article to flesh out all aspects of a regulatory system for financial
conflicts of interest. Rather, the mission of this subpart of the Article is to
highlight a fundamental structural change that could improve and streamline
the process of addressing financial conflicts of interest. The key differences
between the regulatory schemes envisioned by the recent guidance and the
system proposed herein are (1) the segregation of the responsibilities for
financial assessments and oversight from the responsibilities for the scientific
assessments and oversight and (2) the minimal imposition of additional
responsibilities on IRBs.
1. Disclosure to the "Office for Financial Conflict Management"
As is currently required, initial disclosures by researchers of their finan-
cial interests should be made to an institutional office or officer. However,
in contrast to the dual entities envisioned by the current regulations and recent
initiatives (referred to as the designated institutional official and the conflicts
of interest committee), a single entity-for example, an "Office for Financial
Conflict Management" (OFCM)-would have primary responsibility and
authority for the disclosure and assessment of financial interests.
60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 15 (2003)
The OFCM would oversee the disclosures from all institutional research-
ers of all financial interests related to institutional research at three points in
time-annually, before the submission of a specific research proposal to an
IRB, and periodically throughout the studies. Further, the OFCM would
conduct any and all assessments of the nature and quality of the financial
interests held and disclosed by researchers. Because of the magnitude of this
administrative task, an adequately staffed office would be required. However,
the complexity of the administrative task would be minimized by use of the
"presumed permissible"/"deemed problematic" approach. The OFCM assess-
ment would involve (1) determining whether a researcher holds a financial
interest that is presumed permissible using fairly bright-line tests clearly
established in federal regulations and (2) deeming any other financial interest
as problematic.
Disclosures submitted with research protocols showing only presumed
permissible financial interests could be forwarded to the IRB, along with a
written description of the financial interests and an explanation of why the
financial interests were presumed permissible. If the interests were presumed
permissible, no additional action would be necessary.
Upon identifying any deemed problematic financial interest, the OFCM
would impose the prohibition on research and ensure that the research proto-
col is in accord with the prohibition. Written findings relating to any prohibi-
tion on research would be forwarded to the IRB and reported to the research-
ers and the "Patient and Research Protection Committee" (PRPC), described
in the following section. As explained therein, a researcher wishing to chal-
lenge the imposition of the prohibition would file an application for exception
with the PRPC.
2. The Patient and Research Protection Committee
Under the scheme envisioned in the current regulations and recent
guidance, the designated institutional officer forwards questionable conflicts
to a conflict-of-interest committee for assessment and management. Use of
the presumed permissible/deemed problematic approach eliminates the need
for a separate conflicts of interest committee. What is needed instead is a
entity to assess whether a particular circumstance warrants an exception from
the usual regulatory response to a deemed problematic financial interest.
Thus, rather than a conflict-of-interest committee, a more streamlined and
efficient system would have a PRPC with appropriate expertise'to decide
whether a researcher with a problematic financial interest should be permitted
to participate in the research to preserve patient safety and innovation.
Whether the PRPC is a committee that meets periodically or an office with
daily duties will depend on the frequency of requests for exceptions, and the
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number of exceptions granted (given that those cases then require ongoing
oversight). The PRPC would constitute the heart of the management and
oversight system.
As noted, a primary role of the PRPC would be to determine whether the
rare exception should be granted to the prohibition on participating in research
by a researcher with a problematic financial interest. Assessment of whether
the exception should be granted would be triggered by an application by a
researcher upon whom the OFCM imposes the research prohibition. Because
the exception hinges on whether other academic researchers are competent to
conduct the research safely, the review committee would be unconcerned with
the extent or seriousness of the financial interest. Rather, the PRPC would
consider factors such as:
" the thesis of the study;
" the methodology being used;
" the scientific or professional expertise required for deternining eligibil-
ity, conducting the study, and analyzing data; and
" whether another researcher could conduct, or be trained to conduct, the
research.
Thus, in contrast to the conflict-of-interest committee envisioned in the recent
initiatives, the determinations made by the PRPC would be more scientific in
nature.
If the PRPC determines that an exception should be granted, it would also
detail the extent to which the researcher with a financial interest could partici-
pate in related research. That assessment would similarly hinge on the extent
to which other academic researchers are competent to conduct certain aspects
of the research. Additionally, the PRPC would determine what additional
conflict-management strategies should be used. For example, the PRPC likely
would find that the most effective additional safeguard would be some form
of monitoring. If monitoring were appropriate, the PRPC would outline a
monitoring plan, including the form of monitoring that would be appropriate
(for example, review or direct involvement) and the extent of the monitoring.
The formulation of a conflict-management plan is properly within the domain
of the PRPC because the inquiry involves considering the research process and
how to protect that process, rather than consideration of the nature or serious-
ness of financial interests held by the researcher. The federal regulations could
specify that certain other conflict management strategies would be triggered
automatically in every case in which an exception to the prohibition is granted.
All findings of the PRPC would be reported to the IRB and the OFCM.
However, in contrast with the recently issued guidance, the IRB would have
little responsibility relating to financial conflicts of interest. Rather, the
OFCM and the PRPC would have responsibility for the oversight and monitor-
ing of financial interests related to research.
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3. Oversight by the OFCM and the PRPC
In addition to the responsibilities outlined in the foregoing sections, the
OFCM and the PRPC would have certain responsibilities relating to the
oversight and monitoring of financial interests related to research. Responsi-
bilities for oversight should also be clearly delegated to entities with appropri-
ate expertise.
Accordingly, the OFCM's responsibilities would relate to disclosures.
First, the OFCM would continue to review disclosures submitted by research-
ers with financial interests relating to research. Because the financial interests
relating to ongoing research may change (that is, the financial arrangements
relating to research may be modified), continuing review by the OFCM will be
necessary. Additionally, the OFCM should require periodic reporting from
researchers prohibited from research in order to verify compliance with the
prohibition.
Second, the OFCM would oversee disclosures regarding researchers with
financial interests who were granted an exception from the prohibition. As
explained, the PRPC would forward to the OFCM a report from every chal-
lenge to the prohibition. If the PRPC granted an exception from the prohibition
on research to a researcher with a financial interest, the report would also
detail the conflict-management (monitoring) plan formulated by the PRPC and
direct the OFCM to prepare any appropriate additional disclosures. Because
of its financial expertise, the OFCM would have primary responsibility for
preparing and overseeing the required additional disclosures. For example, the
OFCM could require presentation reports and copies of all publications to
ensure that proper disclosures of financial interests are being made. Similarly,
if federal regulations require disclosure to human research participants of
financial interests held by researchers conducting any part of the study, the
OFCM, rather than the IRB, would draft the informed consent materials.
However, the IRB also has responsibilities under federal law for overseeing
the informed consent process. Accordingly, after drafting the informed
consent materials, the OFCM would forward those materials to the IRB. The
IRB would review the materials and ensure that the disclosures become
properly integrated into the implementation of the research project.
An adequate oversight system would also involve PRPC monitoring of
those projects in which an exception to the prohibition was granted. The
PRPC would have the responsibility to assess periodically the effectiveness of
the monitoring in reducing the potential for bias in the research process. This
could be accomplished through periodic consultation with the researchers
performing the monitoring strategies and through periodic review of the
research itself. If concerns were raised, the PRPC would reformulate the
monitoring plan, or, if necessary, the PRPC would reimpose the prohibition
even if doing so would result in the discontinuation of the study.
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4. Additional Enforcement Considerations: Monitoring
Compliance and Sanctions
An effective regulatory system includes methods of ensuring compliance
and sanctions for noncompliance. Under current regulations, the federal
agencies have a limited role in ensuring compliance with financial conflicts of
interest regulations. As explained, the system has largely been grounded in
trust. However, given the problems that have come to light and the importance
of regaining the public's trust in the research process, the enforcement process
should be more vigorous and, as in other areas, involve a greater role for the
federal agencies. Fleshing out the details of compliance and sanction consider-
ations is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a few points should be
beyond debate.
The assurance process is useful and can be maintained. But, in addition,
the federal regulations should impose recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments, as well as an auditing process that would allow the federal agencies to
ensure that academic institutions are in fact carrying out the responsibilities
directed by the federal regulations. Ifthe institutions are not carrying out these
responsibilities, these regulations should provide an effective sanctions
scheme.
Recordkeeping: Federal regulations should require academic institutions
to document their compliance with the disclosure, management, and oversight
process outlined in the foregoing sections. For example, based on the sugges-
tions in this Article, records such as the following could be maintained:
* For the OFCM, researcher disclosure forms; findings of "presumed
permissible" financial interests; findings of "deemed problematic" finan-
cial interests; periodic verifications regarding imposed prohibitions;
reports from the PRPC regarding challenges.
* For any exception granted, the management (monitoring) plan formulated
by the PRPC; informed consent materials drafted for any exception
granted; and reports regarding and copies of additional disclosures.
* For the PRPC, reports of findings for all challenges to the prohibition on
research; for any exception granted, the management (monitoring) plan;
documentation of periodic consultation with monitoring researchers; any
modifications to monitoring plans, including revocation of the exception.
Auditing: Auditing of an institution's implementation of a regulatory
system is an effective means of ensuring compliance, especially if the auditing
occurs frequently. However, federal agencies notoriously are unable to audit
with the frequency necessary to instill public confidence regarding compli-
ance. Accordingly, an effective compliance system will likely need to con-
tinue relying to some extent on self-auditing by the institution. The federal
regulations could specify random and periodic audits by the federal agencies,
supplemented by an annual, institutional self-audit of the financial conflict-of-
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interest system. An audit committee designated by the institution could
conduct the self-audit.
The self-audit could consist primarily of a review of the records relating
to a specified number of research projects. Reviewing records could help an
auditing committee determine the following:
" Are the initial disclosures from researchers adequate for identifying
financial interests?
" Has the OFCM properly identified presumed permissible and deemed
problematic interests?
" Is the OFCM properly enforcing the prohibition through periodic verifica-
tions?
" Has the PRPC properly determined when exceptions should be granted,
and are exceptions properly supported?
* When an exception has been granted, are the conflict-management plans
adequate?
" Is the PRPC conducting meaningful periodic consultations with monitor-
ing researchers?
* Are required additional disclosures being made?
* Are informed consent materials on file?
* Has the IRB ensured that protocols are in compliance with findings of the
OFCM and the PRPC?
While not a perfect means of ensuring compliance, auditing and recordkeeping
can help ensure implementation of the system.
Reporting: The federal regulations should also require the institution to
report the findings of the self-audit. Additionally, institutions should be
required to report any exception to the prohibition granted, along with the
conflict-management plan formulated by the PRPC.
Sanctions: A federal sanction system should be developed and imple-
mented. In other areas of health care regulation, the effectiveness of interme-
diate sanctions has been recognized. That concept would seem to be a good
one for this area as well. A total cut-off of federal funds for research for
violations of financial conflicts of interest regulations would be a draconian
sanction and one arguably not in the public interest.
VT Conclusion
The presence of financial conflicts of interest in the arena of biomedi-
cal/biotechnology research at academic medical centers is sufficiently prob-
lematic to justify a strong federal role in addressing the issue. The time has
come to move away from the traditional models of self-regulation to ensure
sufficiently rigorous and uniform protections for human participants. The
federal regulations governing financial conflicts of interest should clearly
specify standards, require adequate responses, and strengthen monitoring and
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enforcement activities. Researchers with problematic related financial inter-
ests should be prohibited from participating in those aspects of a clinical study
that could be improperly influenced, absent compelling factors showing that
the research could not be conducted without the researcher's participation.
Further, the financial threshold triggering that response should be considerably
less than what the regulations to date have considered to be significant finan-
cial interests. Whether a problematic financial interest exists should be
determined by persons with the requisite expertise in financial matters, and
whether an exception to the prohibition is justified should be determined by
persons with the requisite scientific and research expertise.
Undoubtedly, some of the suggestions in this Article will not be popular
among current university researchers who have significantly profited, or who
envision future opportunities for significant profit, from technology transfer
while at the same time fulfilling their academic responsibilities for research.
And institutions may object to the labor and organizational requirements. But
the risk is real, and the public trust must be respected. The obligation to the
public is to preserve complete integrity and objectivity-as well as the percep-
tion of complete integrity and objectivity.
Moreover, innovation and technology transfer can continue to thrive
without the troublesome financial arrangements and relationships that cur-
rently exist. This Article did not attempt to address the problem of financial
conflicts of interest held by academic institutions themselves. It is possible
that institutions can devise arrangements that continue to assist technology
transfer of the university research product, thereby likely creating some
financial interests related to research at the institution, but that do not raise
substantial conflicts of interest concerns. This is especially possible if the
institution is firm in eliminating problematic financial conflicts of interest of
the researchers at the institution who conduct the related research. If the
potential financial influence on the exercise of judgment by the researchers is
eliminated, the ability of the interest of the institution to cause improper
influence is substantially mitigated. Academic technology-transfer offices
may need to work harder to attract nonacademic participants for the spin-out
biotechnology firms, but that vision of transferring the university research
product into the for-profit sector for commercial development may be more
consistent with the congressional vision underlying the technology-transfer
acts.

